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HENRI AGARD iAl.kAC':; AND LATIN AME.RICA (1932-1946): 
'll: E I..i..j.{l'S OF AMERICAN l.IBERALISM 
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Th9 crowd waited alLu.ously, expecting the nominations for 
'I ice Pr,;::sid'.::nt tc Dall.a lilomentarily. Throughollt the gal.leries 
the chant. u€Jan, Itwa dd.atWallace! U It swelled into an uptoar 
dildo the Chairman cf J.;.u€ ,;;;'>Ilvention, Sam Jackson, despite all of 
ais e£f~rts, could aat stop the chanting and the noise. 
;io'inally Jackson ca . .i...l.€<l for adjournment. The entire stadium 
a:etorteJ "lio!" Sam J;;1C~S\ .. Hl spoke up, tiThe ayes have it ft alld 
tae dayswoJ::k. at the ;; ou'l.lntion ended despite all of the booing 
lIhich tb;jChiLir JIan' Sl.CLLHl instigated. Tlle next day, the 
d~tti-WalJ..ace iorce..i ad.d manipulated enollgh delegates to 
!.lominate HaLey S. 'rr;,uaufor Vice Presid-ent on the second 
olallot at tlH~ 1944 De.aocr<:1 tic conv:entionas theregula.rs within 
tae pal: tt fle.x€ d. th.aJ.'c m'lS cle. ( 1 ] 
rli·a iig,llt tetwei:tLl t;.h~ li.beral New Dealers and the more 
~onservat~ve Dixiecc;;1t3 and City Bosses within the Democratic 
tl:l·cty had been 'kcn il'{ the .latte.r. The defeat of Wallace was 
sapposedij proof ~f this fact. Political and economic 
Jemacraci which Wallace D~lieved to be at the foundation of the 
Liberal priacilles iaLj~ng the Democratic party were only a 
Ityta. 'fue consert,it""ve dLelllents within the Democratic party, 
.'Jt'.riea (Jilt£' the .l.le.;;;.l.;.stic rheto.ric Wallace used, fought to 
maintain t.he stat 1:5 -lito. in his seconding speech for President 
doosevelr. 1 wallace ;;;tac.<!d that.: "The future belongs to those 
Ii ho go down the 1 ine i.LilSiid rving ly for the lilleca.l principles of 
...Joth pol~tical a.ndecOaOllll.c democracy rega.tdless ofcace l color 
o cceli~i()n.rn a pJi.it.J...:al,educational and economic sense 
2 
t.i.1ere ultJ at JJ€ no iaiec~;J£ races. U [2] 'These goal were not to be 
J:>aali.€J. let desp.l.te t:.he fea.rs of the city bosses and 
SQa thera po..liticL.Hu c,:i.1sed by this type of rhetoric# Henry 
.". ~a....i..ldce was a lib~cdJ.. .:lnd his reform measures were limited • 
• al1~ce entered. UU~ Roosevelt administrdtio.n as secretary 
of A3ricil..ltu.ce in l:JJJ!. ~le was well qualified for the position 
~3 he was a man at mdllf talents. Wallace vas already a well 
ltnOAR galleticist and possessed. an extensive background in 
aconomic3 aad farm ~eL~~ed problems. As editor of "Wallace's 
i'd.cmer,"wuich las a Ulaqa;t;ine his father had started, he was 
iatimate.Ll .ir~vclved in the day t3 day controversies of the 
iarming co&muLity_ 
As secr:ataI:Y of ~YA: l.>;; alture, Wa.llace belped to develop a 
f;lCIl1 program aimed at raising farm prices. In keeping with 
!;dr 1y Newlh!al };:01 . .1.C1, the farm programs developed under 
A :illace at.tsllI ptE. d 4; . .) ce store economic stability to the farm 
;;,)mlllunitj rat.he [ tb.:lar.;:i.>rm the social injustices within the 
,i'lc lcultur:e comiliuniA;/. ,iallace ca.rried oat the task of crop 
l:!str<1ct~oll dS well .:1.;; slttughter of over six million little 
pigs in ~1& LDitial attampt to raise farm iacomes. 
InjeI":u: aI, b.a pu !:~ ued a middle path devising a strategy 
of subsidizing fa.tme.;:-.;;i jlfJ:H.le refraining from price fixing and 
advaCdted iaceativea '0 induce farmers to curtail production 
Jut attelllpt€d to LeSl.3t pr.:oposals for mandatory controls. He 
.idS ~llterested in J..Jlpr.:vlfing cOllditionsior the most destitute 
~ithin the farm cQ~ill.aiLY b~t not at the expense of losing 
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:iilppO.ct of the Juj.lC idem organizations and he did not trj to 
,;haugi! t.lle E:::A:isting C.J.dSS structure and mores in t.he America.n 
aJriculture industry.(3) Zhis is best illustrated by the plight 
:)1: tlle S41ar€;CLOffers WO£A.J.ng in the south. 
In 1934, d.L. i'i.Lccae . i..l, who had begllnto oI:ganize the 
311arec1:opper.s, persilcl.deu his friend Norman Thomas to tou.rthe 
i all th Q.nll issue d det:li.4.t:o!<1 repo.rt. The Tho mas report charged 
that t.he A'lricultuI:J.l ~dj ustmen t Administ.ration{.A. A. A.) was 
~ce~tiDj ~orse COU~J.t~ous for the sharecroppers. Larger 
':arme:cs first .iti4dr-iHI from production lands which were 
cJltillated by t€llants aaJ sharecroppers dnd these individuals 
_ere pusaed off th~ lJ..uJ.[ 4] It appears that the sharecropper 
\idS sdcrJ.fic'dd .fOI pul.LLJ.cal and economic r'3dsons although 
Latar OD in thE jew aeal the Department of Agriculture 
:lttellpteo. tone lp ta.J.;i SS·", ment of society after i·t took over 
the Rur3.J. Resettlement Ad~iniEtration (R.R.A.) 
rl1is ~atteJ:.o .0 aCdlAlaa standard practice for Wallace 
d.3peclallj in hi E fl.J.u coacerningLatin America. In the midst 
of ;1 cIisi.s, the system Jldd to be protected which usually meant 
c.hat the a.J.ready esti;lD~ished interests were st.rengthened • 
. ~fter tile stabilitya.nd. aaLnte.nance of the system was assurEd, 
;fork coul.d .bejiniu iii:claS whicil attempted to comi:lattbe 
tlrohlems ot tncse wha .l:.u~Ld a relatively insignificant stake in 
tJ:l{.~ system. 'lhese l.1t tac plans a.nd the Wa.llace rhetoric ear.ned 
tl1~~ Secccltarl of Age .. :; \ll.i:~re his liberal reputation. 
WaH.ace scen M.ln .j, reputation as a liner al 11 New Dealer" 
fii:i.llly on the FIoqre,;i;;:».iv~ side of most of the issues. Although 
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u '~atlpei11ed. tc the C-Jra Jelt, Wallace scared most of the party 
r~lulaLs. he was tag~g~t to be a poor politician and had a 
raputation for DystLcLsm. Democrats as well as Republicans 
,Jelielled wa.iiace to ~a Ita ,uaive and woolly minded idealist.. as 
"'d~l asa .lil d spU,4deA.:. Wallace, as Secretary of Agriculture 
'.ind lateA: as Vice .Prd~id.hl t symbolized the past excesses and 
the "future dangers oi tha New Deal."[5] 
AlthQuga iallaca was thought to be at the left most 
,~;(tI:eiile wi-thin his j?:J.cty, many of his ideas were similar to the 
;)~liefs held .by lllo.ca cOilservative pacty memners. He was more 
asnaitivd on on iSSUd~ du~h as the conditions of the poor or 
jiscri •. l.uatioll a imea at socia.l and religious groups than many 
o .f his fellow patty ill '3illJ.l8£S; however his .,loals, andt.he means 
~o aClliav€ tUt':!!lI, were more conservati ve than most people of the 
lay believed. ~cwhara ~s this more evident than in his views 
cag ,u:u.i.a'jLatin A lila c ic d.. Although Wallace was loved in Latin 
A !lie cica Pi:" iwal:" ili' llE:!;;aas~ of his idealistic rhetoric, his 
actions at.factjng ..,iJCJ.i1.l. and economic conditions in the 'Latin 
a::!mispbere were "i~t.ULn ~he mainstream of American liberal 
pDI i tics. 
In 
ilowaver, 
illdny illst ::UlC~S.u. s speeches svunded alilost idealistic, 
~,henrl:et,)ric 1ifas transformed into action, his 
were mere c~n3e~vative. Despite dccusations of being 
Ifa.llac~ .doS a mid-western progressive whose 
.J~liefs aDa. idEdS "ur~ cesembled those of Herbert Hoove.r than 
~ :1I: 1 dco.Jer. li ke duOlH:C, Wallace strongly believed that tbe 
tree enterprise sj~te.i CQ, ,ld overcome all obstacles in reaching 
the goal oi aCaDemic i8curity for the common 
p£'oJressJ. ties be lievad .Ld business-worker 
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pJ:otection of civil rights, and 
illt.erest .of men with idealism. The majoJ: 
;iifferS.Dce betwEen t.u~t • ...) was Hoover' sfea.r of big government. 
"';·illace did not I:eje,;t idcreased government planning or action 
.utdha taOJght that q.,)wecnment could be used as a check on 
•. ):lsLness .:l.bJse as .a.L.J,. as a resource to be used by business, 
iiLikin.J t.aeir joh €J.3~er. 
ily eXiimining Wlll.J.ce f s views on Latin America, it may be 
l~;nanstl:ated that U.:: W;.lS more conservative in his methods than 
~reviousll beliEVEd a~d tnat Wallace was not as far to the left 
:13 his reputation or the actors of the period perceived him to 
Je. JihilB Ius eaJ:ly cauu.;.jhts and plansregdcding Latin America 
"'car! reldtivaly icea.i.J.s,:,;,i\; and called for a major change in the 
status -1<10. wallace ';{ .4icK. yrea~ized that these plans faced 
.1.RSlIr.nOl.UltaD.lE: C.ilstac.ies. He then abandoned them in favor of 
i,le,;tS .. .ai-ell waLe dl·JJ:.e acceptable to the powerful groups 
fanctio.llJ.llJwitbin "Ud hemisphere. Thus Wallace, who was 
£'epresenti1 tive c.f t.a~ i~ ft wing of the Democractic party 
thc::lugb.vut the 193J.' aad 40smay a.lso be used to representt.be 
limits 0": l:1..GecalisJl. Xb.~ overwhelming desi.ce of Wallace to 
"" :Jck th'I.Hl<jilthe SYSl:.dill forced him to ccniorm to a rate and 
r...lpa of ch.an:J€ ii1:ica .a..::i acceptable to the most powerful 
''J lemeats ~.a the €list..i..llq s ta tus guo. 
Th.L~ does not m,hid that Wallace was llo·tcritical of the 
flowerful gro:.lps oFerar..ia'-l in Latin America. He had wOJ:ried 
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.ibout tile et.tects ilL Aillac ican investment in the hemisphere for 
.i cansidec4ble len~ta of time. The turn of the century and 
ldi.lScial..ly the 1920~ W.:.iS accolapanied by a substantial incr.eas·e 
.La Jnited States inVd.:itill~a ts in Latin America. At the tUJ:n of 
~he centu~J united St~ta3 investment there totalled 308 million 
.iollaJ:s.. un the E\1e .If!il;,lJ:ld (Jar One this figuJ:e grew to over 
1.6 .aiLlion dollars ;ind 1 ust prior to the depcession the total 
"n.s in e.iCces.:i of 5.ij .oi"'1.1.on dollars.[6] Wallace opposed the 
.:..ntdnsive i.uvE:stll:eat U13cause he believed tllat most of it 'was 
i.tot beiuj used p.rcpe.rl.Y aild that the U.nited States Govec.nment, 
Jy fcJ.~a • .l;ng a fclicy of protecting American investment abJ:oad, 
ildsfoster iIl-J illpeJ:ia.L.iS.lll and war. Wallace .believed that the 
jover.nmeut .:ib.auld Ol.lt -4 uarantee the foreign investments of 
uecono~ic a~ve.nturdc3."(71 
At .the SalllE: time tiu.~ investment was taking place, an 
U1C.ceaseJ. D\lJ1be.c ot stu.de.nts and intf.dlectuals withi.n Latin 
.America were Marxist political and eco .ncmic 
J(}ct:cine..;i", (b j Cc D Sf!<;i ilea 'c,l. y I ·the stag-e .for a showdown was set. 
rile seeds ot: ce¥clutl-ln<.lJ:( nationalism had been planted and 
t. his maae it llECeSSii4: y tv r: the united sta t'Ss to begin to adopt 
.:.\ nl3w me.cllod of settiin·~ }lI:oblems conc-erning the United states 
witbin tbe hemis~here_ 
:r..hl.~ problem .ai:a a .. a:u.owledged long befoce the inauguraticn 
Ji the Good Ne.ig.hl:or ~O.l..l.cy. In a memorandum on the Monroe 
J.:>ctt'lne in 1.:128, J. B~!lJe.n Clark undeJ:stood the inflexibility 
~f the carc€nt metb~d at l.ntervention especially in instances 
.~ece 4dtioaal defwl~e could not be legitimately claimed to be 
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""t stdke.[ ') JThus iil30Jle ways, the Good Neiljhbor policy was 
aot a draJlld.tic c ha.n:J~iu lJ ni ted states-Latin American relations 
Dut iastead ~as only dn official acknowledgment and approval of 
3entiments which e~~sced in prior administrations. The Good 
and ,new 
step i'D 
cransfor.Ju.nq a ] ukeilaJ: m a::!misphere into a well organized and 
content com~~nity. 
j<!ig lu)Or policy lidS a n':J method of dealin-q with old 
t'roblellls aad \ias .~ .ap pu se dly a successial first 
riuca COli.tto~er;il e.~sts in revie.wing the e,ffectiveness of 
cae Good .ieizjhbcL po .. i.l.C~, specifically because the policy was 
.h~var spelled out. Sullie hist.orians believe the Good Neighbor 
f/olicj ca ae a markeo. snit t away from the era of the Big s,tick • 
• iisto.t'iaas Ii.ho are p~()pone.nts of the Good Neighbor policy 
aelieve ~ua policy Wa~ d Jreat and continuin1 improvement over 
pOJ.~cles • hi;;.! J.lJ.d previously heen pursued • while 
.Lnegua,lity continued to e.&:ist, it was sta.rt.ing to ,De reduced. 
j')st importautly, C.le l.eaders o.f the United states gave more 
",tteution t.o hemispheric .celations and this led to an increase 
LD cooparation • fa .. s C 0.0 pera tieD. took many forms. United 
.>tates business intaL'dst;~ were still aD.le to operate ia the 
aemisphere while tDa ~4tin Americans were started on the road 
to indust:c ial developme.&t through the benefits of American 
tclc,uno.logy The United states shared the 
lacision making Elocessas with the Latin Americans and t.his 
~reated morre frisBdir and cordial relations within the 
.aemisphere ... ( 1.0) 'Ibis aaill appl:oach might be easily demonstrated 
i n "any coatee vez:sie3. 
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Aft.er ~he turu ;.)i the century, the United states bad 
~~gnificdat investmeats L~ Cuba. Before removing the troops 
stationed 00. Ue L;;i.b.llii after the Spa.nisa-American iar,the 
JJlited States i.os.ist.eJ on a per.manent treaty which included a 
.::lause ,Plat t lu.aaadmea t) allowing America to intervene 
J&.Lli'tarU.y~n t.he C)IJ,iitCY' s domestic affairs. The United 
states Llltervened ~~ t~a occasions during the early twenties. 
intervellt.~04l was thoti,jllt t.o.be the best mea.ns of protecting 
1.1lVestmsAts on the i.:.u.;ind which was the pcincipal source of 
United states interests had 
..;onsidEraD.L€ in vestaa nts in the suga.r industry and other 
;:ireas.( 11 ] 
witJithe onset Qi t..d::: depression, t!le economy and social 
life in CuLa was sev~ri)Ll disrupted. President Roosevelt sent 
;j ,1111 il e1:' ia.Lles to the l. sJ..a.iid and he initially .appeared able to 
..!ontrol L.Ue chacs. After: the interim presidency was toppled, a 
Jl.smaledtlelleste qua.i ted the Marines in oI:'deI:' to p.rotect 
t .. ma.ricau lives alia p~Q~erty. Although PI:'esident Roosevelt 
lispatchad a .. ava) fJ.cce ':0 the area, no t.roaps la.nded on the 
lsLUld... PoLitical <ind .,;conomic persuasion were sufficient i.11 
':O.il If inciu:J an d I: Ii.} st:!.c:Ie,;lU t named Sa tis ta, jnohad previously 
led a c~volt l.n. tAe army, to assume control.[.12 J 
NJn-iutervent.ion, dct.Ae foundation of the Good Neigh.bo.r 
policy, .ll"d p.1oveu to;)e saccessful in its first major test. 
do~e ver, other t€sts~eL'''; to fo.110 w. 
Anotner.example Jf.t.ne supposed effectiveness of the 




;!I:BsidellL 1a.Li.i.l:C Caru.,,;:ud.S expropriated th~ properties of the 
oil cOlllp::Ui.i·as operatiu1 in Mexico. The 'expropriation was a 
L"clSpOllSe to the tefus.:il of the oil companies to accept a 
':i<!cisioll Dl thE~il.:!",i,cad labor board in a labor dispute 
l.ilvolvin'.j h:i1.h€rwdge.~ aad better .fringeoenefits for t.he 
,f-Jrkers.[ 13] Net only aid the United States recognize the 
Legdl1.ty of the expr'.)i?cJ.~~ion but some members of th,e United 
3tates GOYeLiuraent SIl";.a as Ambassador to Mexico Josephus Daniels 
,.I')r l<ed lUJoJd faic,a 11 i1:.41 both sides in order to bring about a 
;i ~t t.l-i3 meat-. 
In November ot 1942, an agreement was reached not 0111y on 
t.~H! oi.l (;ont.co v.e rS1 J.H t Viol othel: outstandi.ng issues as well. 
A::lriirl.d.l1 claims 'iec~ s(-!t;.t.led and a reciptocal trade agreement 
Jas sigaed.. The cloll.ar ?e,so rate was stabilized and the United 
States lJled::led to pucci;I.-:t..ie newly Ginted Mexican silva.I: as well 
<is financ.e f.iaxicets i,l ... U:tl.JB of the Pan American highway. In 
the c a.se of 11:e (11..1. co.ntrowersy. after each .nationchosE aB 
axperc t~ determine LaG ~~ount of compensation. a figure of 29 
~illion dellars was redc~ed despite the original claims of the 
,.>ilco,lIpdnies thdt tn~ pcope.cties should be valued at 260 
al lIlian dolL:n: s. ( l.ij j .;)eiiJ:,)i. te resistance in .both the private and 
~u1>lic 5~ctors, the ,;ood Neighbor policy brought about an 
;::!ffective settlElIent jll;;»"- in time for the war. This settlement 
allowed the uuitEd St.;ite.s and Mexico to more easily cOopErate 
in wax l:el::ltel arei:1.:i as the hemispheric so.1idarity. which was 
tlar::eLved ·to be essenti .... l to the war effort, was easily 
Jlail1tai:aled .aetlleen 1',JO')..1 neighbors. U However. this is not the 
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iiew ~f all nistoliau~. 
Crl.l;ics of the ~ooJ. ioieighhor pelicy have alledgedthat 
~ hile tne UnitEd States policy makers used new rhetoric and 
Jlor e often .I.OCU se d th'3.i..:: il ttention on Latin Ame.rica, economic 
~elatl.onsaip.ii at the f.;) l adation of United states-Latin America 
celati OllS rediainE d esseItt.4. ally undisturbed.( 15] These economic 
rel:1tionsl1ips cu,at£::,i do sta.ble atmosphere which .helped to 
perpetuat.e soc.ial ana ecoaomic inequalities existing ,within a 
!idjority oj: Latin Ai.U~rJ.C;;ln countries.. Wllilethe United states 
,iid pu.csue policies wluch admi ttedly gave Latin Amer ican 
J3ver~mellts a largar S4are of the economic wealth which was 
J 'aing taKen £1:. om the countJ:ies, this increased the dependency 
of theSe! govarnments unt .... e united states. 
Bytbe late t.uictJ.es, many countries, ,especially those 
Ii hie h eXJlort.ad ~ t I:at~,j ic ~ ar .related mabH:ials, had ,expanded 
productioa Ln crdar LO meet the demands of d growing United 
3tates .nd&:ltl::t. At tae S,l:4e time, these caunttLes produced less 
load and. thus tel.i.ad tJ an even greater degree on the UnitEd 
states for foodst!;ff;.». lU.so,by reinforcing existing class 
.celatl.GIl3Uips, the Jni.t~d states helped to stop social reform 
~ud revolution which ~a3 ~ncreasiong during this period. The 
,.;oo:l .NEu'1hbu J;clicy ":&s an attempt by the United states to 
~~et d somewhat dif~eceat environment than had previously 
~ .ci;;;tedl..ll Latin .i.lllec.l.C a. It was a per ioa during wilieh 
AlllecicdilDusifiess int;~H;asts, supported by the United states 
jJvernmell-t,at temptE:J. t.a 1:011 .back the tide of revolutionary 
30ciai Clldllga in LatJ.a aJlI:! rica by maintaining a conciliatory 
11 
,1ttitude towards th~ lodtin Americans and by giving them a 
Larger sai.1,rE:: of the ;::.:oaolllic pie .. 
In the SPE cifl.,;;ci1 se of Cuba I whi,le the Roosevelt 
"U'lU.nisi:ra tio11 did a~t l.a tervene mi1.ita,rily, it approac,hed the 
fir 3t cr.l.,sis i,a tat.l.A Alitei: iea in a traditional manner. As 
JavidG.ceeh peints oat, Roosevelt operated on the assumption 
t.i1at "U.nited States .l.ater.:sts in the ,hemisphere could be upheld 
III anilaterd.l fiat.JJ '£aLS fiat was exercised in such a way as 
topto'tect and llaint.dLll the "existing social and econemic 
3tructure of Cuo" aqainst the threat of revolutionary 
,utiollal.l..:itic cb ange. ,. (16J As time passed, the administration 
',lIS able to develop. a more flexible policy which did not 
)pecate under the assumption of a unilatera,l fiat. 
dev8£thels.:is, this more mature version of the Good Neighbor 
~olicf attem~ted to .l.~sal~te American nationals operating in 
.. ,ltin AtlH;~rica from l:D.e effects o,f revolutiouary change. 'Ihis 
• as acldeved p rillaci.!..! c.at: oughthe use of ecoaomicincentives. 
Ample evidellce fo.cbu.3 new type of policy exists in the 
.;oat.coveL:Si over tbe.13.x:ican expropriation of American owned 
oil lands. 
While .a. had been reached in the oil 
c:ontt;Jve,:sl, the United States Government continued to press 
i,!.}r the return of Alie.cican multi-national oil companies to 
ihulCO so that the ~oJlpanles could regain t,heir favored 
J?ositUHl.. The set:t.lement between the companies and the 
Jovernmentoi Mexico whica was brought about by the United 
states ~as but a temporary aberration in the United stat~s' 
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ilo1icl of SuppcLtin'l prJ.. Vii te in vestment abroad.. The departlire 
teom traaiti')llal to1J.ey lidoS caused by the perceived Nazi t.hreat 
~o the Aelllisj;>he.re. :.rae U.aited sta tes temporarily placed issues 
.; ucn as this cn tae ,L a-:k burner in order :to cement impro vinq 
1:'e13 ticns with ler .I.ai:ill A mericaa neighbors. Once the threat 
tl:.tssed, tl,e state D~p",rt.lll.Jnt immediately pursued t.he oil matter 
iurth,er, ill dn at temjlt. ta reverse the natio.nalizatioll. r 17 J 
I'lore ilili>Ortantly ,t.he action taken nnde.r the Good Neighbor 
iJo1icy espEcially 'itI.i..t.., regard to the oil controversy was an 
;::4ttelllpt to iJlsur~ aDd p . :otect a dependent ty.pe relationship. 
lilt .as not specific pl.iCCeS of cOLporate p.toper·ty that were at 
stake bul;. a 51 stell." III the short run, government policy might 
tempocarLJ..Y be at odds with particular interests in the 
;:;oatiduiJHJ gile st to oId.i.!.t4in the larger system. 18] 
Th~~ the GGod aa~g~~~r pol~cy was an attempt by the United 
state.3 to \J.pdate~u.e ilJ. ·ethods it used in dealing with Latin 
il, llHH'ican governJleIlts.. idtervention was no longer a suitable 
~aans at acbieving ~O~L~Y objectives as this approach was too 
Laflex~b~e. Whil e it m~JAt work in a single instance, it was 
ilarmful to overall Uliit.ed states-Latin Americanrelatiolls. 
rnter~ention ill a~ no l;)uqe.L' necessary as the united states could 
dette.c pursue its ::Jiljcctives by using economic incentives. 
j3st i.>fthe united St.a.t~s· po.liey objectives concerning .Latin 
.( .. mer ica. li.suall 'I r~'C.dr..ied Latin Americanpolit ical, .economic, 
4ud social g~o~th ia 4 d~cect as well as indire=t manner. 
P.'1E-j.941: IMMATURE THOUGHT 
Th.coug!-lout the 19j\joi the center of American attentiollwas 
iaCllsad on damestic .l.;;jSile.:i. By the middle of the decade, 
dcoDomic r~coveIY iud slowed and even reve.rsed creati.ng a 
faeling of u.1lCertaillt,1 "liong an already weary populatio,n. The 
majority of A aericd..ls were still under the infl.uences ·of t.be 
depcessioa despitE :t,dd attempts by t.be Roosevelt administration 
<it relief, relief j,.iD fJrms some considered revolutionary for 
tae Amer.LCa1l. p oli tical. alta economic system. 
Heury A. ial1ac;J, tilen secretary of Agriculture, s.hared 
in the ndtiollal coasailoi us. The urgent sta te of America's 
aqricultaral indastry W43 his primary concern throughout the 
decade.. Altll()Ug,h the cloads of war were already on the horizon 
by theidctecpatt of the decade, the secretary of Agriculture 
Jenerdlly dealt liiit.n dOlil-=stic farm problems. Although Wallace 
aad often displayed dB ~nterest in world p~cblems as well as 
Jlobal political i3SY~S, the demands of his position afforded 
aim littJ.e time to adacas;i the topics. 
1I,hi..Le tile AgrJ..'; uJ.tu..re secretary labored at restoring 
3taDi.litl in the doms.ii tic agricultural markets, Wallace did not 
completely i'lIlore AllId':: ieall foreign policy issues.. Wallace's 
alos·t inteJ.lsive expasuca to foreign policy issues were those 
~hich ~ere directly reJ..ated to united states domestic 
,a,gricultural pelley. ~£ ten, foreigo policy questions which 
.;once,rn·ed the Departlllanc Qf Agriculture were local in nature, 
~sually cn~y enCOlllp~s3Ldg the hemisphere or countries within 
it. Heln~spheric ag.cJ..cU...i..ci.lral problems were Wallace's first 
&ig11 Level €AfloSll1:e t ·;) is.:iues concerning Latin America. 
'.fru:ol1Jhout t.nis e.:1r ... y period, wallace displayed a general 
iIltet:'est ill hellispA~ric problems, even addressing issues 
.>utside the a.gricultilroll field. He was a staunch proponent of 
the Gooa iiei4hbox:po.iicl af President Roosevelt and gellerally 
,achoed exis ti IIg £)cJ.ic y posi tions maintained by the 
administration. ialLftc~~'S ideas concerni.ng Latin. America were 
,lsual1'y vague and g3uar.:11. although ,by the end of this pe:a::iod he 
lid realize the Iotel1t.id.l 1:01e of America's southern hemisphere 
1. n ecO.1l0lll.LC rela ted acce4S. 
ily 1939, iallace .:edlized that most individua~s living in 
the UBited statEs ~aew very little about their southern 
l1ei:Jhbors. WhilE 1.49 uood Neighbor policy had brought t.he 
llemisphere C.J.OS,E1: to~C;! taer, the majority of Americans kaew 
t'racticaJ.ly nothing abuut Spanish culture. This ignorance was 
c~e foc~.:i of wallacef~ ea.cliest plans. By late 1939 Wallace 
~as speaKJ.L::l in tl1a pa.a.J.ic forum on this issue. He advocated 
the inclilsiou of tau .. AJll~rican history as well as the study of 
3pani5h in the cil£:r..i.Clllum of American high schools and 
.:;011e1£;5. He also stJ:essed the need for a greater circulation 
of American becks traJl.-:ilated into Spanish so that they could 
~eCQme more ceadily d#ail.:1ble in Latin America. 
Anotberpla.n wouJ.d iac1ude af.requent exchange of art 
~xhibits throughout th~ larger cities of tile hemisphere. His 
two most important iJeas c.ance:a::ning cultural exchange dU1:i.ng 
t;lis early period wc:!ra ;:ietting up an iateIAmecican university 
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for post gralua te stll,j Y oiad most important of all, the Pan 
American Hig b1liay. JlaLle the highway was al.ready under 
const.cuctioll, it s comple£.J.on would mean that AIll'ericansvou1d 
£;)r the first tillEaa dQL:! to travel to the southern hemisphere 
l..ll <lllanner withintaair Jleans.[1]~allacets interest in Latin 
~illerica incceas~d 4~ he better understood the fact that 
l.Ilterdependsllce liitu.a.ll tae hemisphere would continue to grow. 
1.f tuere was to be d s£401e community vithi.D the Americas, the 
Jnited States must dll it3 part to foster good relations and 
illutJal understanding. 
1.11 the eccnom.l..':: spaere, Wallace believed that much could 
ae done to heing the u.elllisphere closer together. Eco.Dcmic 
reciprocity wasessaut.1...:11 and an increased number of business 
trips by inch.vidua.ls ilfit:.1.un tbebusiness varid was to .be a 
must. dare im~crta~tlJ# Latin America should develop and 




prod uce. l'h~ 
that. if pLans 
two examp~es most often used by ·the 
were rubber and hemp.. Wallace 
such as ·these were carried out, 
J.ncreased h~mipl:.El:ic scl.idarity wo uld result. Latin Ame.cica 
had ill ani things .HU.Cl1 the United states .needed just as the 
united State3 cculd.Je (Jf great benefit. to the Latin American 
llations. 
In d.iscussing "-he need for Latin American development of 
.cl1b.>ler, l4all.ice statel t.d.,J. t: "This will require the ntmost 
;;o-opetat.ion oe·tlleea l.ar;;.in America.n people and resources aDd 
.forth Amel:'ican seiene.! and capital; but t.he job can and will be 
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lOllew.l.thin a few yaacs after the will to do it definitely 
.tppears. lf£ 2] coo{;erat.l.Oll was to .be high prio.rity as it would 
,mabIe the Ame£icaa aeUlisphere to become almost ·elltirely 
1.1ldepe.1ldell t oi the "ol.d world. fI T.bis would allow the Amer iean 
c.lemispheceto develop wJ.thout interference from t.he old world, 
d world _~ich was pLeparing for war. 
ial.l.ace sEemed to believe that greater hemispheric 
cJope.ratioll would De oi. significant benefit to every Latin 
i\.i\\ericaa aation as ta·;li.ceconomies would not continually be 
Jiscupteu. Latin American na tioRs had faced a serious 
depression aftel: Wcr.d war One and the growing war in Europe 
liGuld likely CLing dbout the same results. The United states 
iilould a130 banefit icomt.ole plan because items such as rubbe.r 
'liouid no:thecome as scarce. iith the exception of Germany and 
Japan, t.ae ilea ias aat. designed to push other imperial powers 
,HIt o:f,the hemisp . olera. However, this would have been the 
<;!ffect.. :rhe incLeasa in cooperation callEd foe by Wallace 
\lIoald Ad-Va i!Ild.tIEU tlle U.aited states to stcengthen its hold on 
Latin Am.aricd. By dai7eLaping materials such as ru.bber aad h.emp 
.1.11 a relative!j ciased hemisphere, 1.atin America would have 
become even dl0rE depaadenc, upon the united state;,:; for export 
lllarkets. A cclcniilL cat-her than community relationship would 
have resulb~:d. 
'.£here is nc eviJ.eace to suggest that iallace desirEd 
jreate.r Ame.r,ican cOJltroJ. of thehemisphez:e at this time. It 
.l.ppearsthat the FlaIlWd.S broug.ht forth in good faith but that 
...:lle ralllificaticns of tlle idea were not adequately addressed. 
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2~ia is £epresentativ~ o~ one of Wallace's major problEms 
(iuring tll€ depressioa alld throughout the early war years in his 
thoughts cODcerning ~~t~~ America. In many instances he did 
llOt fally co.apreLend t..ue ~mplications of his plans in realizing 
Latin American devel~pmenc. other general prohlems with his 
plaosiorhemisphec l.C d.evelopment existed throughout these 
periods as w3~1. 
uU£.ll1g this ~c iCHi. Wallace' s political and econc sic 
tllOilgIlts concernin~ J.a<J.t.lU America were in most instances vagu;e. 
:r nis waspciJlar i1y be;;a.aSd th.e secretary of Agriculture was 
;,tnf:lllilidC>lii tb the pXJ.Dlems of Latin America. During this 
Lleriodne under!tcod \:'Hl~f the most basic aspects of Latin 
aiuer iean problEms. Altaough Wallace' s ideas concerning Latin 
America Jere still in t~air infancy, a great deal of his 
politiciiJ. philcsopay .redched maturity at this time. He also 
developed SOille et his m;.;st basic economic ideas. 
ThrQaghout his l~fe, Henry Wallace was an avid supporter 
;)f d~moc.t'acy. tS.lIlOCJ:dci, wallace believed, should be at the 
foundation of evelY l';Jhtl.cal system. The foundation aftha 
:.lemoci:atic fiJ.ith iJicliJded ideas whcih were taken for granted by 
H\(}St Am:acica.ns. First., dction should .be based on the will of 
the Ildjori ty af ter a aat.iou's people had sufficient opportunity 
t.o info.t'1ll themselves dS to the facts. Next came fI:'eedom of 
3peecll, pre~s, the deb», science and re.ligion. ThiI:'dly, 
3talJilitt, orde1:, and the avoidance of all violence, bloodshed 
iJ.nd anare.hy. last and 4.11 some I:'espects most fundamental, the 
t>I:'omotion of a sttlllle but ascending general welfaI:'e .by 
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l.nc.reas.illlj the ~t oJu;;ti \14 ty of the people and distri.b uti.ng the 
J.Rcame as evenl} as p~.ssi..;le without destroying the incentive 
to 'produce.l)] . 
This foundatio4 nel.d many assumptions, assumptions which 
jallac€ iater fa~Bd de co~ld not apply to seme of the specific 
t?ronlems of Latin AllarJ.ca. The most fundamental of tJ:ese 
assumptions was tha·t do given population had tha ab.i.litJ to 
J.ai OtlU them.:iE 1 Yes aii ta c. he facts. Also, Wallace assumed that 
a g ivan order wl lell CJ uJ.d maintain stability in are.lati vely 
damocrat.ic society, .;iQ.·()u.i.d not he radically altered regardless 
·.If the ecouom.ic and SOCl.a.l. needs of the society. Although he 
l~t ,ar iAodiiJ.ed these .LJeas, the Dulk of .his theory did not 
dpprec.iaQly change ovar tae course of his career. 
It is i~ this ea~ly period that Wallace developed his 
Dasie ,Political pllJ..J.Qso?hy, a philosophy whichvou.ld greatly 
affect iu.s iJeas concetniug Latin America throughout his life. 
rhe seeds o:f ccntraJicC.J.on were already pnesent. On one side 
.Lay theiL:>eE:do liS af speech, art, religicn, the press and 
3ciaDce as well.1s .tlle ~dea that wealth should be distributEd 
::1:3 evell~y as possiilla, wJlJ. .le on the other side lay the concept 
.)£ stabilitj. 'Ihe ia.ea. lJf a stable environment hath political 
and economic was to D<:!C;)llU more imFortant for Wallace as his 
career p.1:og.cessEc. iAle struggle between these two fundallental 
ideas was the f OCIlS Qi Jcu.lace' s most hasict houghts. 
In tlla econCllic sphere, one of wallace's more important 
ideas surfaced dur~ag ,his early period. 
role of ~arge corloratio4d Wallace praised 
In discussing the 
their skills of 
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.Ladi vid\£al ;Janagelllefti; :1.il. each particular instance. At this 
tilDe he .Gelieved t~lat cat:porations did not know enough about 
their cule ail d .IespG..lsiu:1.1ities to ·the societies they oper ated 
lIitilin. WallacE tel.l.eved that the c .ritical problem facing t.be 
linlecicall society ia qeJleral and the major corporations in 
llarticul~r, lias that 4lu.L~ individ nally the corporate sector 
a-ld expanded p.ccdnc.t.J.\)u, collecti veIy they had not yet learned 
lithe SEcret oJ: El~andl.ll'i consume.r purchasing power as rapidly 
;" .-~ .:;"::3 prodl.iction. fI( 4jlilis is another idea which vould beeo.me a 
center of attenticn f.)[' lid-Ilace and his plans concerning Latin 
A Jleeica. Be jonld .Later focus a great deal of his thought on 
cilege,necal problem at pu . :chasing power of indi vi<lual countr:ies 
d.ud how it aifecteu Unite.i States-Latin American relations. 
By the End of ai;ii tenure as · Secretary of Agriculture, 
ilJ.llace ilagan to rea.l.l.ze how important Latin America might 
.Jeco lie 111 th~ Ileal' fa t. lire. A f .riend later wrote to Wallace: flI 
.;an see t.liIenty jears, more or less of the greatest prospe.rity 
,)ur cou.n:try .aa.s eVd~ seen--not exploiti.ng these countires to 
()UJ:SOUu.. .DUt. by Iecoastruction."[ 5] As time passed, Wallace 
:aolded ll.is plans t;> j.lktintain and expand the economy of the 
united states sc that it ,,;ould function effecti ve.ly in Latin 
Ame.c ica • It was aiLer tais that his political blueprint could 
.)e successful.ly illpleile.l1ted. However, Latin American reIa·ted 
prob.lems .ece placed 0& t.he back burner by the mibble of 1940. 
,Jvse the summer, Wall.iCa _as chosen as the Democratic party·s 
choice to£ vic~ Pc '~s.id(! nt. The campaign trail would consume 
the majacity of his Gille until election day ... 
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wallace rested J.J.tt .. J.e after the 1940- election. In. late 
ivovember he trave.lel to Mexico to officially represent the 
J.ni ted States at the .Lad. U-i uration of President. Avila Camacho. 
ior Wallace, it was" .cadnce to visit part of an area in wbich 
lH:! possessed a str:'>ilg >J.nd ever-intensifying interest. He 
received a first .li1nd look at some of t.lle problems Which 
J.nhi.llited clJser United S~ates-Mexican relations and the visit 
enacled.nim to fC.tm d personal bond between himself and the new 
t>resideat of Mexico. 
Xhe t.rip matked.i new chapter in Wallace's career as a 
f>llblic servant.Foc tll.e first time, Wallace was being used in 
.tIl area outs.ide of 11J..» .ipecialty. T.he new role meant that 
.illiace had. to De 1B()ca sensitive to diplomatic protocol; 
.:~re.fu.i.ll lIIou.itorin'l ais ,Jwn remarks both in the private and 
pablic forum. In all. it was a new expecience for the Vice 
Pre3ideat elect, cna J.D luich he prepared for in his usual 
liligent IIl.d.GlIer. 
In p.cepa ration i. O.L ..; amacho' s inauguration, Wallace sought 
ilelp froil several SO<.1ccas. He received a list of many of 
.d-axico's cult U I al aad iA tellectua.l leaders who would help him 
~ndarstand caltutal t£ends within the host country and afford 
Aim eXFosure to the i-adl.v.tduals whose thoughts and ideas shaped 
j,~xicol s con;3ciocsne::a::a.( ill The usual preparations were made .b.y 
state .Dapa1:tment o.iiici.tls as the entire Ame.rican embassy was 
placEd. d.t the ViCE Pres~dent elect's disposa~. SUmo.ar Welles 
.rote WaJ..iace stcItlybeivre the trip: "It is a pleasure for me 
to congratulate JOu <.1poa this important appointment and to 
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a.ss 'Jre 'J0u of my des~r:e t.aat all pLoper facilities be placed at 
j:Jur disposal. ttr 'I ] 
iial.LdCe recEivedhLs most valued bac.kgcound information 
i.rom his friend, il;l.1:o1d Younfl :who at that time worked for the 
law fir~ of LeakE. Haacl 1 Young and GoldmaB in Te~as. He would 
latdr .oecollle a Vic~ p.ce.;;iidential aide. Young advised Wallace 
\111 a nUli.oec of pr:eSS.l.llq issues,. with .regard to the continuing 
~i.l controvecsl, lOUiHiha..;.d the position that the oi.1 companies 
Jere askiug tee mUC-ll vi. the Mexican govecnme.nt primacily 
.o)ecause tat! refinerie.-;i CIJald not compete with those in Colombia 
ill: Venezae.la due to tile .tagh sulfur content of the Mexican 
£\1e1. According to Y{)lh1g, the American refineries had ceased 
ta be commercial aDd Cae basis of the objection to the 
d ,xpropriatioll Gf tad OJ.I lands1lias t.hat it would seta 
flrecedellt which lI.iqat aef ollowed by other Latin A.mer iean 
il.1 tl ons.t 8 ] 
In the agtjcult~ra~ sphere, Young explained the plight of 
the iaLiIlers t.hroughout. tila country who after harvesting their 
corn c_rop could IlOt. JH:..) teet the stored CLOP against weevils. 
Je st.ated that any l.lljividual who could alleviate this 
canditi()ll would r Ji..lt'c11 Jesus Christ in popularity and 
~ecommellded that Wal.l.dcdolodvocate the building of granaries 
;lith mec.hanislH to kil~ of.., the 'Weevils so t .hat the Mexican 
.?opula.tl.on could tatt.ar feed i 'tself.( 9] On a more general 
i ,evel, Young thcught t.lut the dollar polici,es would bring about 
aostilitlin Mexico d.-;i .tlley had to a great degree in Cuba .. 
.'loungJle.1iel/ed tl:at •• .. __ ;Jur dollar policies have not worked in 
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Cmba and wi~i net wor, ~a Mexico."[10] 
It jIlust be ~tres:ied that many of the positions which Young 
~om municoGlt,ed to iall:.1c-a were in contradiction to the positions 
&dintained hy thE St~te ~epartment. Especially in the oil 
i!on t.cover::;y, in whic(1 t.-aa state Department consistently ba,cked 
American natiGnals \)perdting abroad almosthlindly. By 
.lnderstandiIiJ these u';lo.Eficial points of view, Wallace gai,nEd 
.iU.lCa respect 1:rom tha p~ol?les of Mexico. 
In late NOVEmber, lial.lace embarked on his first official 
trip south of the u\.)rdec. Arriving in Laredo, Texas t ,he Vice 
President e.i.ect a.sS~1:teJ. that t1Whatever benefits Mexico 
,.Jenefits the United :ir..i.te.s in the long run.lff 11] Although he 
did not elaborate on this statement, it appears that Wallace 
Delieved tj),at leng £ un American prosperit y was partially tied 
to ·thefortunes otaexico as well as all other cO!.mtries of the 
llemisphere. aeM.ic;'}·s economy could not remain dep.ressed 
iithoat lldviag an ddv3r;;a e effect on segments 
aceDemy.. Statemeats such as these made 
of the American 
Wallace extremely 
£lOP 111a1: .i..a Maxico. oi.llldce crossed the bridge into Mexico on 
foot and then proeeeJ.ed t\.) Monterrey where he was received more 
dnthusiasticallj tlia.a allY visitor in the city'shistory. The 
five mile route was l~ood by crowds estimated to numner betlieen 
jO,aOO aud 1.00,COO p~:csoa;;»who threw confetti and flowers. All 
dlong ~he route tha cro~ds shouted and sang their approval of 
t.he Ailerica,n .cep.rese.at4tive. ( 12] It was theiirst time an 
.i.il1portant offic ial .;jf t.ae Uni ted states visited Mexico and it 
was perceived by the Je..:l.::an s as a taci·t acknowledgment by 
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2resideat. R;losevelt of che importance of MelCico to the United 
States. 
Wallace OVEIcalleaJ..S shy and rese.cvedmanner and endeared 
,(limself t.o all claoi.:.ie;;i af the Mexican p0J:ulation. On his way 
co Liexico City, walla.ce v .. sited a peasant farmer in one of 
Mexico's rucal aceas dad conversed as often as he could in 
spanish. Admiration ':01: t.he Vice President elect was mOst 
lloticeable when he eat-a red the Chamber of Deput.ies for the 
With h~s entrance, spontaneous cheers and 
;;1pplause fill·ed tad rooua ion an unprecedented demonstration of 
J:<:!spect aud affectioil i:;)r an American. The Wallace trip seemEd 
to cepresent a lJeil3J:a ... D United states-Mexican relations for 
t .ne IldjOl:,i ty of the de .tic;1n population. 
This does not lIle.in taat the consensus among Mexicans was 
t:;)tal. There iEre lilaay citizens of the country who still did 
aot trust Americans r4q.lrdless of appearanCES, and t .he Wallace 
ant~urage was ccnicQntad .by Mexicans who held this belief on 
~~re tbaa OMe occasion. Upon his a.rriva.l in Mexico City, 
wallace drove thcou;,fa iIIi.liJS of angry rioters .who pelted his car 
wit.ll rOCKS .. o u taide o .f tae American embassy another riot broke 
aut in the Evenin" wa~ch had to be broken up by police usi.nq 
tear gas but aot bef")ce a.ll American reporter covering the event 
lias strlle;c o1.ltbe CdCK afthehead with a fist or cluD. Insid·e 
the emtassy the official dtmosphere lias cordial and friendly as 
it dinnac party Wit;3 in pIogress.[ 13] The historical animosity 
wilS due to tile peI:cel.~ad t:!xploitation of the Mexicans by the 
Amecicans; e sp-ecia.i.l.Y recent actions taken befor·e the 
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.1.nauguratio.n of tne uo.)d Neighbor policy .. ttO.S.-Me.xican 
celat.1.ons .b~t WEeD 1 .. 1:> ~ nd 1933 were fill·ed with conflict and 
ill will .... IIi 1 q) This ~;J.S supposedly c.hanging as indi-eated .by 
the friendly atmcEphe.ce ae. the inauguration .. 
The il1duguratioil took place on December 2 in the late 
iIlorning. PJ.: :.!side.nt ~J. rdenas entered the Chamber of Deputies 
.followed .JJy Callachu. ~fter taking the oath of office, Avila 
Camacho wdS 'li ven the .P.i:€sidential sash by Cardellas and the 
cergmony lIa3 compl.u.e. with the exchange of the sash. United 
.ita t es-dexicdll t:ela t.L.\ln~ .L nstantly mioved clos'er. Life .Magazine 
noted that "Nothin4 CQQld have shown the urgent importance of 
]dxico to t .he U.nited .ita tes than President Roosevelt f s choice 
)f his nelCt Vice Pre:;u.Jent to attend t.be i .nauglira·tion of the 
ll3Xt President of Ka~.L.Ca.nr1S] 
Aitez:tlle inaaq>1.ca:tiJn, Wallace sat down with high level 
19xicdn officials ..a..adael.d a series i)f discussions regarding 
Although no concrete 
l?J:o;Jre.ss was made on ailY of the existing pLo;olems, closer ties 
Jetlleen the two natioas were brought about.[ 16] The spirit of 
tue Good t. ,aigh1:c.c ~olicy was maintained and auqmentedas the 
trip resi.l .. H:ed in a sOlid t Qundati':>nfo.c future Mexican-American 
ties. Positi ve feaJ.iBg~ existed within hoth countries, and 
President .Roosevelt DelJ.9ved that the Wallace excursion had 
t!ro,iuced "exceedingly u;iieiul results. II! 17] 
'.l'.he Vice Pr9S.1..:lellt. elect returned to the U.nited states 
;lith iAany .Be. ideas 'lAd impressions on a wide variety of 
.subjects concErnjng rlex~co and Mexican-American relations as 
.. ell as tile role of tlH! II.a i ted Sta tas 
For: Wa..i..iaci;!, t 1:e l10st i mportan t 





nelllispheric solidarity i()£ the upcoming war effort. Much as he 
mated to believe ~O, *allace felt that unofficial American 
involvement in the 4a~ waa inevitable and strong hemispheric 
ties were to lie eS,ientia~ in any war effort the United states 
_as to .l.llvallie itself l..a. Wallace was Extremely concerned 
4.aO 'lt &azi aeti v it.1 lit .... thin the hemisphere and advocated 
apecific mea~UEe& to curb the influence of the Third Reich. 
The fit:at D,easur:e ~o curb Nazi influence, which was 
advocated by iallac2 a his report to the S·tate Depart;nment, 
;IdS to .Drfoe Latia Amid rican newspaper offi,cials or belp 
3ubsidi.~e nawspa ,pers vao presented ·the allied point of view. 
iilallace stroagly tel.l.dved that this would result in the latin 
AllIecicall pilblicoe.:oming more sympathetic to the Allied 
posi tiort. This ill as ;;i method which was continually and 
.,;0 uccessfJ..l1y elfI-loyaJb¥ the Nazis. Wallace believed that nIt 
Jlight be worthwhile cOllsiciering supporting in some real but 
.:iuiJ tIe illdDlh!r the jfOl.IU:;, of view of the United States. n( 18] 
althoilgll this viclated wa.i.lace's ethical code to some degree, 
taethceat t.o lIo.c:lj iI-aace and individual frreedom made this 
type of policy essential. he thought that fire had to be fought 
liit,} fira in this particllJ.ar ins·tance. 
Also of grEat ;.JBcern to the Vice President elect vas the 
postage rate fo .c pUO.J..1.Cdt.l.Ons. Latin Americans were able . to 
purchase mora B1Hopeii.a l?uulications because the cost of sending 
t.neboc~s anJ magazines _.is less for a European publication 
t.aan fo·J: its COUll terpart. 
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Wallace strongly 
recommended that the post..;J.ge rate for these articles be reduced 
so that t~ey woulJ De more competitive.[19] Emergenci~s 
.aec>!5sitated the use of al.l methods in the destruction of the 
"evil" wnic.avas iittalD.fjting to spread over the hemisphere. 
fhis ~as Lmperativa 43 ehe "evil" spread by the Nazis meant 
cnat less progress c;)uld be made in all other areas. Once tbe 
Nazisw€..c€ defeated. tAtJ.cesources formerly devoted to that 
.Jat tIe cou~J. c nc~ 4.1,1 .l..l,ll be used to materially help the people 
of Latiu America. 
wallace's cnly other fai.rly well defined plan was in the 
field of agricultur~. He urged the United states to send 
A me rica's technically ad ianced farm machi.nery to Mexico as well 
,:is ot"haI Latin Am~ci;dllnations. This would al.lov Latin 
American t.arlllers to i.a.lCC';;l;.4Se their yields. The exporting 0.£ 
tech.nology :lould rasul.t in mauYDenefits for both the United 
StatES aud tile Latin ,4I1ecJ.can countries. First, Latin American 
nations would te La a Detter position to feed their poor and 
;ulder-nauris.ned. T11.1.3 ,:,iould help .hring about more. stability 
withiu each country. For: the United States l the spirit of the 
Good Nei:Jhbor fe} icy "oill:.! be furthered Which might translate 
Lata Detter OIlcrtllB.it.i~s for the American business community 
as lIell as a grEater j:H:obdbility of the United states achieving 
J:lemispharic sclidacity. Wallace stated that "Simple 
experimeutatJ..onand d~lIo.ul:itration with corn and beans would go 
~ long way toward i~provinq the lot af the majority of the 
dsxican peapi.e."[20] thils goals within each country of the 
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il.emisphere liould O<! met satisfying the American goal of 
r~ciproc.J..tl. 
On a more <;eaerd..L ..t..:!vel. Wallace recognized the widespread 
corruption w.aich exist.eJ. Jon LatiJi America and he voiced anxiety 
ovel:' the linle bEtween Ame1: ican business inte .rests operatin 9 i .n 
.exico dud wealthy ofi~cials who were constantly augmenting 
.;.heirwealta by d.J..iiiDq these foreign business concerns. 
w·allace realized that flFoceig.u companies furnished a large part 
;)f th~ liIoaej which h.l1;3 aid-de it possible .for many of the higber 
:.lffici.als to teccme wEalt.hy."{21] Unlike the State Department, 
~ allac€ believed that ttid social and business mor's which 
allowedthLi tc happen should .be fought. He appears to have 
ceca gnized t.he linK datwe..;n extreme poverty and revolutioD. 
III a majorit .y 0", L;;i.t.~n American nations the 192()s vas a 
time of iatensi ve iOlr9stIAent by foreigne.rs. While this enablEd 
the g.r;ojf~ng BU m.ber ol PO!)£' to find employment, it did not 
..1ppreciaD..LY raiSE C,:.l€LC standard of living as raises in the 
.age rate were usu-J..lly offset by increases in inflation. 
3.heldoti .I.iss .has fOl.ated out in t .he case of Venezuela, "Prices 
Jrew fast.er than Wa<;Je3, d.il d the nation was scon unable to feed 
l.tself or to affarJ .La ported foodstuffs. ll{ 22] Fort-he upper 
dtrata o.t socie tJ ou .:.he 0 ther hand, foreign business activity 
anaaled iIIany to hecome ..l.acreasingly wealthy. Besides the poor 
psychological state ot ta.;.:: .populationwhic.h the conspicuous 
cansumpt~on helped ~o Jring about, the relationship between 
.loreigJl caapaJlies aadt.ae upper-classes of Latin American 
society heltlE!d to c£.A.pple the av,erage Latin American consumer. 
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An axample of thj~ occuJ:£ed in Venezuela. The retail price of 
VeneZUEl.an gasoli.ne 'iaoi aig.her in Ven·ezuela than in the United 
states evell af tEe slU.PP-l.il4 charges and taxes were added to the 
AJlerican price. ( 23) IIftl.;;ials of the Gomez regimev.ere able to 
j.llcrease their veaJ.t h t. hrough bribes received in this 
drr dBl]emell t. 
AIlQtaez: related p£ublemwhichwallace forecast l was the 
?ossib.le excess FJ:of1.ts o£ the American business community in. 
t.lle devalofilent cf l....Ltiil America as lIell as the excess prafi ts 
.. !ii cll could be real i"ed when the hemisphere began to 
:i.atensillely pJ:Epare fJ1: defense.[ 24] .allace was a staunch 
advQcate of capitalis~ dad the feee enterprise system but he 
was not anavalE of tile excesses and abuseswbich the system 
30metl.mespermi ttEd. Ad a labora te d elsewhe re, Wallace thought 
tnat the .best way to .il..cing about d€velofmentwas th1:oughthe 
pcivate sector. 711i". WitS also to be true in the particular 
,(,ase of defense pJ:epa.ca.tioD 1 althoughgualified. In the case 
of defea.3e, incLEdsed qov,ernme.ntal supervision was necessary in 
.)rdel: to hette:&: co.;)rd~.aate defense plans .but WallaceaEver 
4aiveced in ais telief t.a~t the private sector could produce 
the best. aa·d fastest c·esults.[ 25] He did believe that part of 
the business sec tee WaS s;.)lely interested in its ovn short term 
Joalsdnd t .hus atte"apl:edto profit at the expense of the good 
aitha hemi.spbeJ:£. Ie. was this segment of the American 
uusiness . community over which Wallace voiced concern. fl ••• we 
,;;an critl.ciz·e many of (tue corporate directors] for having very 
iitt~e IOlowledge d .,j;,)UJ; tile relationship of thei.r business to 
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the gen~ral welfare o'103r ;,i period of years_ fI[ 26 J 
In dexico, the V~ce ~resident elect witnessed first hand 
some of tb·..! ccnt.cddict4ons of American fo.reign policy- He 
ilude.cstood tne d ESira o.f Roosevelt for a more closely unitEd 
llemisphere aDd at.teJlpteJ. to formulate policies w.hich liould 
cealize tuis goal vn.Lle at. the same time mater-ia.lly benefitting 
the fcorer segments ()L Latin American society_ He realized 
tllat a geaec.u lack oi trast existed within Mexico and that 
this ft:eliHg was ~epr:asentative of other Latin American 
cOlJntriel;i. He thcugtltth<1t this was p.rima.rily a result of past 
aconomic and dipJ..;Jmat.l.c manuevers which to some degree 
continued aespi t .e t.ae oJff icial change in United States 
.iJl1ernmeat policies. DaJ;.i.ng a dispute over the property rights 
..>£ foreign llatio.nal.i dlJcing the Harding era, the Harding 
administration t£fllsed to recognize the Mexican Government 
until it .~ou . .Ld 9 uaranc.ee ~.he protection of allegedly American 
Jiln.ed FI:operty. An oj..l Cil mpan y representati vevho was involved 
ill, th;i! controversy nor-a,! J.n his diary: "Great good fortune. see 
dleJII all today--and vel: f truly no L€cog,ni tion of Obregon until 
American interests al:a tally safeguarded •••• A most satisfactory 
;jay. ilL 21] Mare Ieceatly, aite.r the oil nationalization in 1938 
tlle state De;artll€llt had .lleen working on the side of the oil 
;:.:ompanies in at tempc.ia g to bring abo'lt a settlement in the 
lispute. TneSE types Jf ac-tions hurt Mexican-American 
celations. 
Wa~~a.ce thought t.J1dt the new president of Mexico, Avila 
~amacho, want.ed to moV'e Cl.oser to the United States; however, 
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the qua.stioaabl e pC.;lct.ices used primarily in the past by both 
a merica.n busl.ness aM gOlJ~ rn mental officials created a domestic 
COIlsellSUS within M~~ico which severelylimitedaccepta.ble 
J.lternat.i.ves for the new camacho regime, forcing it to steer a 
<lQre mod.erate co\.u:s·~ d;i far as its relations with the United 
s·tates i1ieCi! concErned.. .",llace s·eemed.to imply that., over 
t.ime, tbe Ca llaeno reqiilte wou.ld move closer to the United 
.itates. After his tJ.:.l.P ha reported to the state Department: "I 
iiiD convinced. _.( Caillacho) is fully aware cf the economic and 
politicaJ. importance ;;)f tae Uni ted States to Mexico and t.hat he 
.1.S anxious to 1loveJ.Jl our di~ection as fast as political 
necessities permit lU.ll to do so. Iff 28) 
wall. ace) s ii.cst >:itteiil pt in the .field of diplomacy was a 
Jradt success. Be lidS iIlvre sensitive ·to the goals and desires 
\)ftlie focei(jJl Ilat.io..l he gisited than most State Department 
:.>f:ficials w;)rk i ug in L.a.t. ..... a America. This is primarily because 
aa appears to ha ve delllOJ1.st ;['a ted a hetter understanding of the 
l()n'~ta.clll needs ot aOi:h the united states and the .Latin 
America.Ll .nations.. d.i.3 sat but friendly manner tcemeBdously 
J.mp.ces sEdthe nEW aeju .. cd,a President and this enabled ial.lace to 
iocat a close perscn,il.rel"" tionship with th·e new President. The 
trustwl1ic.h i.cdlace add qdinedwas especially important in view 
af the fact t.hat top Stdte Department officials were generally 
parc.ei vea as ad.1ei:S;l ries especially since the oil 
dxpropriation. 
As a dip.lomat,t41e Yl.ce President elect demonstrated a 
keelleye, uaderstand ..... nJ d.nd reporting existing pcoblemstothe 
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5tate Department ina. p£ecise manner. The fa·ct that Wallace 
iiJ.S aoe a statE Depart.ment official allowed him to be more 
cr itical of so mE A me.c.1.can actions wi thin Mexico and present a 
lIlore balanced picta.ce af what was going on. After Wallace 
i:eporteJ to the PIe.:il.Je'tt regarding his trip,. he focused his 
attentioll ou hi~ te.r 'jOD, t.he Vice Presidency_ 
Opon returniag fca~ Mexico, Wallace was involved in the 
31o~ pIocess of settl.i.Qq J.,nta his new office a.f Vice President. 
Wilile .a~ hd.d IOUlla. .u.i.;i cld job as Secretary of Agricult ure 
f; lld.llengJ.Dj dnd EJ.trdillei.y time consuming, his new position 
:3eeillEd to bore him <lad a~forded him large amoun·ts of free time 
to pursue bis ottEr intd£'asts.. He used the time well as he 
:Jaioed dbettEL . ullJersi:.anding of defense matters through 
ceg alae discl1ssic.ns .ilJ. til • .hi te House staff persannel.[ 29 ) 
Par the firstaaif of 1941 , Wallace continued to explore 
';:'ati,n AlIlerican cultuce. This was an ever-growing interest for 
che vice preaidEnt aaJ ~e used part of his free time to educate 
uimaelf in llIatt.ers cancerninq Latin America. Although his 
.l.nt,erest ill .AoIatin Ara-arica had greatly expanded during this 
period, Wa~lacE's ~Jeas remained general and vague. With the 
exception af plans to paa:"ly combat Nazi influence within the 
<lamisphe.re as veIl (13 ;J. partial agricultural plan to aid Latin 
america.i1 ,iarJlers, iiI.:L.iace's thoughts on Latin Americallad not , ' 
let matured. He .-!J.d ,aot seem to possess d great historical 
l1ndarstandin 'l of the cont..l.nent nor was he aware of the possible 
c ~mifications for S;)IIB of his earliest plans for industrial 
levelofillent in tatinAllIer ... ca. 
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A~tlloilgh Walla.ce's taought was still ,not well defined at 
this time, cae FEtiaJ. m,iA:~ed the start of his career as a world 
dctor. DUI'ing this p~I'ioo Wallace began to better unde.rstand 
;rohlems ill a glo1:al jlerspective and started to concern himself 
iii it.n world aad s~ecif.t.c .;l.i.J. y Latin American p.roblems ona much 
j)J:oad~r scala. while w>Jr ... d events such as the war led the Vice 
l?reaideat t.o study p~ese.a t and future world problems more 
iiligeut.J.Y. ;lud altno.1gh. ~allace possessed an increasing desire 
L() stud.}' Latin AmericdIl culture, Wallace's asc,e .nt to becoming a 
c;:e dible SpilXeSlIan loU c.heworld forum aP.fears to be partl}' a 
.reslJlt o:i luck. Had aot. doosevelt forced the nomination of 
>'1alJ.ace as D~moclatic Vl.ce presidential ncminee,fate, and ve.ll 
Jrganized Wallace ea~mie~ would have left Wallace as the 
Sec.teta.C'y of Agriclllture. The timing cf events in this 
il .}rticoUJ.d..C' :illstancep.C'ol(ed. essential i .a buildillg Wa.l.lace into a 
aationa,l aud world. ~e.:ljar. A new American spokesman loved by 
:the people of Latin America" his role as Vice President enabled 
him to devote much of .a .... s energy to developing a general .J!lan 
of actioa foe world peoDlems and the specific problems of La·tin 
America. III yene.taJ.., 1u.5 early plans for Latin America vere an 
~xtensiou of .his dome.<:it:i.c ideas with the added dime.nsion of 
.::ooperation betweeea . q:overnments. He already understood the 
l.nterdependent [elatloonSlup which existed within the h 'emisphere 
dnd the possi.oilitie..i toe Latin American development wi·th help 
from tile Uiuted state.::;. wallace would further refine his ideas 
dS the !II ar prcg.C'essel. He noted that: "Science, capital and 
Illanagement, if f ostera d .by sympathetic governments, can make 
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c.rapica,l l.a.tin Asu:ic<t .... .nt.o a significant new frolltier .... "[ 30] 
, 
JaLI 1941 - ~AI 8# 19ij2: "THE CENTURY OF THE COMMON MAN" 
After iionths at iuaction and boredom" Wallace's talEnts 
'Mere fiil.a~ly hatDEssed as President Roosevelt appointed him to 
the chal..rmaI.1ship oi tlle Economic Defense Board {EDS) in July, 
J ':J41. Lu AU';Ius·l.lid.1.J..ace was made chairman of the Supply 
l?riorities Allocatio.u uoard(SPAB). As was charact.eristic 
j;,lrinqtlleRoosevelt te;1lJ~e ill office,t,he mandates for these 
~xecutive agencies 4ere ill-defined. 'Ihus rivalries were 
formEd illldmeaninsfu.L act.Lon was hampered by the fact that no 
clear l:.Lne of autaor.1.t.f existed and the decentralizatiol1 of 
<luthor it.y cJ::eatEo an allv.u:onmel1t in Which con-tradictory acts 
iere common p.lacEdllll dl1pJ.icity ofwock a standacd pract.ice .. [ 1 ] 
After the Japa .... ese attack on Pearl Harbor, Wallace 
received his most sa tl.s.t .ying appointma.n·t. By executive order 
Pr8side:at Roosevelt ccedted the Board o.f Economic Warfare 'REi) 
.::Hld the Vice Pres~d.eJlt was appointed chairman. The board 
assumed tha .cespcnsiu,.i.lit.i.es of the old EDB but with a stronqer 
Juudate. For the .first t.i..me, Wallace headced an agency with the 
potentia~ to pu t i.ato ef.i~ct programs which CQuid shape post 
liar relations withill tae hemisphere as lifell as conditions 
!If ith in Latin Amer iean ilatJ. ons.( 2] 
Wit" this nell assi~.aiJlent, Wallace became involved viththe 
lac ef.fo.ct and how it W.:lS affecting Latin America on a day to 
day ba.sis.. He bad not De" un to think about how the BEilcould 
e ffect .iioc.ial change a;.i well as win the war, althollg .. h he 
3ta.cted to LealizE t.ll,,a piltential by the end of this period. 
Wallace expanded 11.1.3 .,n;.)wledge of Latin AmericMl problems and 
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;)eg !}n to develoF his p03t war blueprInt during this t.ime. For 
ilallace. winningt.he .ae lidS the first priority as his speEches 
3tressed the social ~roq.c~ss which could .be realized after . the 
iI cU' rat.ber than dUJ:j. B~thellla.r. It was important however. to 
.;).:!g in F~d..o Diilg a IostW4C society which allevia ted the basic 
tlroblems of the w:.lcld <ind Wallace had a clear vision in this 
ceqilrd dLtlloagh his pLans usually lacked detail. 
On a general leval. jallace believed that the world had 
the potelltial to 112 iree fro III want .. For Latin Americans. t.his 
1l ,2ant that tae.re coalJ .ole sufficient food for a balanced diet, 
propec living dlldwol:'king conditions, a job for every 
J..lldividilal wnosouqnt. ila£A as well as educational opportun.ities 
for all wllo desireJ t.i1e m. For Wallace as foe most. .~iberals, 
technolaYl had given .aa the ability to solve all of his 
Jldterial pI:o.blells. de st.ated that ffModer.n science, which is a 
D 1- pt:odl1ct and all ess~nt;i.;&..l part of ·the peofle J s revolution, 
11 as mad~ it tecl,nicd.lly possible to see that all the people of 
tlle WOLld get enOll'lil t.il eat. II{ J] The problem as Wallace 
t:>erceived it:, was to naraess technological advancements throug.h 
t.ae estaDli~hmeIlt and maintenance of world consensus. Thus, 
trade iigceements wo"l.d .nave to be reached, a renegotiation of 
cari.ffs woulj hale t.)i:a.1<.e place, all national cur:re.llc.ieswould 
to be staJ,)i.L~zed and the world community had the 
cespoasiDilitlto J..d.sur~ t .hat all cQuntz:ies had adequate 
pl.1rchasil.l:l POWEl s;;> til<it the system would not breakdown. 
wallacoS 4;)ted that: "all Lhese facts and factocs are of pxime 
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Lmportance ~n determLnLn~ the state of the world's health, aDd 
they will naturally farm ;a ome of the main ingredien·ts of post 
.,ar economic plan ninq I i.f this is to be done on a comprehensive 
sca.le. Hi i.I J In short,ddllace believed tha tthe potential 
existed for an otder.l. 'I wac 1d economic system .. 
Alt.nollg.a Wallace a.pp~ars to have ,been extremely optimistic 
d iJr ing t.il1s per ied, p'<1 rt.s of his undetailed world vision had 
<il.ready ytoiln more cOll;;;iervative. This is primarily because 
w<illace was continua ....... ' gcowing mO.te practical. He began to 
temper llis idealism ... n OJ: der to develop an effecti ve, workable 
plan.. At the beginJl..l.ng of. A merica IS involvement in the war, 
If.illace sta-ced that. gO.J.d should he used as a base for all 
rlat ioaal currencies aild "as a meaDS o.f setting in ternational 
teale ba.lances. tI( 51 l'ai3 policy of standardization would help 
tooring about. ::tabiJ..Lt.y in the world community and would 
consequently J:Esult ill an expansion in world trade.. The 
ill;,)nitari~ation of two met .... ls in the world community as well as 
Couiltr.ies lriaich based their currency's worth on no metal 
Lllh.ibited. wor.id trade. aud in vestment. Business concerns lacked 
.::onfidence and ooaLl aot receive as favorable ·treatment if 
thei.J:coulltry III as 011 a g.o.i.d sta,ndard and a paten tial in vestment 
cou.atry WdS Dasing it.a ca.crency's worth on silver. 
Before iMallace tOOl( offic.e as Secretary of Agriculture, .he 
flirted iilith the ide.t of .;.iymmetalism. The plan cal.led for the 
remonitarization of siiver at some a.rbitrarily de.fined p.riee 
aaar the market pJ:ica, aad each united states dollar would be 
.llcited part.ially IJ'f g;).ld and partially by silver. The 
.i.ndividualtlould not De allowed to redeem his 
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dollars 
\!xclusively in either go>LJ. or silver and thus the more precious 
metal would liot be dcl. ven out of use.{ 6] Wallace believed that 
tilis wOil..Ld s ·tim"lat,'-'! t.rade between the united states and all 
other couJlt}:ies en tile 3..£..J. ver standard most specifically those 
LU Latin America. 
'fh ·are are severa..!.. poosible reasons for Wallace's change of 
position on this isslle. ~~irs·t, just as he believed ·that the 
"~r ld could not re ,4al.ll JJ half free" and Uha!f slave I" he may 
.J.l ave deci.ded that haY J.aq a atian-states back th·eir currencies 
w it~ two metals w~udl create more disocder for the world 
com ill ullity I a .ad for ' laiJ...i ce achieving order was a pcimary 
concern.. Bd.pid pragce.s:.i could 0:n1y be made in an orderly 
J.1tternatl.ona'" syste.m. AS lOJ~g as order could be main·tained, 
the wor~d communitr would be able to devote its energies to 
solviJig satecial ~ro~ .... e,;as. 
He majtlave a.ls\) .be.l~eved t "hatthe larger industrialized 
u iltions which LEl1d.1.ned eltclusi ve It on the gold standa.rd might 
'1 ie'll tile move \lDfavoLduiy and undertake Uretalia tory" measures, 
a.gain ccea·t.J.D.g disQcder. Finally, Wallace had enough common 
sense to allderstandt~atJ.t was easier to have the smaller less 
industrid.li:i.ed natioa.i cOilform to a world order rather than the 
t.schnica.lly mOLe ad v.iaced na tions, who usually had a larger 
staite iLl e.<isting t~nillicial arrangements, reoLieint themselves 
t'.) a nelll syste Ill. Asli"..i..1. ace was .further exposed to Latin 
A ma.cican prall.lems aad lIorld problems in gener aI, he lIlodifi·Ed 
.a is post wac Ilan3 as his practical side gained more 
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experience. 
By the end of 1941, Wallace .Degan to address problems of 
iats:raatJ..onaL illlEortaaca. According to the Vice president, one 
:)f t.he most d a lIa9iaq iJJ:oblems to internationaltr ade and 
ecollomic sta~ility W:l3 t.he continually fluctuating price of caw 
ill:l.t€tl.als.WheD d~iUailQ was heavy, underdeveloped nations 
exportin':jthe vdriolls r.1_ materials received high prices and 
conse~u,eu.t11 had s~ficJ.ent capital to maintain a steady 
industrialization sc~ed~le_ When demand fell off during the 
cyclical depCESEiclls ".lu.ca had occurred app:roximately every six 
to ten years, OJ: ~heD.~sl1pply of the material grew at a faster 
cdte thall t.h.Ee dem;;1n.d, prices dropped markedly. For the 
ilnderdeveloped Cculltcl.esthis .resulted in a drastic decrease i.n 
llational income wLt.l.ca JllEant that these countries could .Dot 
purchase sOile cf ,11a excess goods produced by the 
industri.lli:zed cCllntrias and the und,erd,eveloped nations bad an 
~vell more diificult t4IDe LEeding their p0J;ulations. By not 
~\)rchasing thefillLihed goods of indus·tl:ialized nations, ·the 
.iitaatia,ll WIiS ag;,raifate..1 as demand by the industrialized 
aations, for the Cdw iIld.t:.ecials produced by the underdeveloped 
countries, filrtheI: 5J..,:1CKened .. 
wall.ace believed tlId&. this problem was at the foundation 
)f tile cn..aos which e~J.stej. in ·the world economic order. If the 
price of raw mateJ:ia.l.s coald be maintained at a fairly constant 
level, then underdellel.oped nations could more easily plan for 
the ma.ii1tenaace and e'&:pd.ll.;iion oft..heir economies. Also, t11e 
:.lnderdeveloped natioils' p~rchasing power would not fluctuate as 
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:.i re ;lt~1 sot.ila t the .3pl.raJ.. of depression would b e lessened as 
these less industrl.dll.4tiid nationswQuld be able to maintain a 
llHH:e steady pu rc hasin,,j raa:e from the ind ustrializednations. 
Ii allace believE d a II lle€d (existed] for an Economic arrangement 
1:.0 pLotect tae tav-mdteJ.:'ial producers of the world from such 
iiolent fluctl1atiol1 ill income as took place after World War 
.I..I'[7] 
To combat this pJ:o.IJlem, Wallace applied his domestic 
a'lr icaltl1ral pl a.ns C otae world economy. He called for total 
coo peratj.oa an thE aqc iclU. tural surplus problem. [a] He believed 
tnattlle avec-Dermal -jrau;iry which had been llsed effectively in 
the united states cOl1id wark on a hemispheric scale. Tbis 
,.()uld llelp .fa IBers C41rOll.,J hout the hemisphere maintain a steady 
l.ncome t~r:ough guariul tea-i minimum p.rices and would be of 
jj.!n~fit to the COaSl1l1h!£ by keeping the price fluctuations of 
food s<taples to a lIinl.mulll. Another added benefit of this plan 
~~s that a suc~lus ~toc~ would be maintained so that supplies 
4 ou1d always lE availa~le to alleviate the hunger: in 
war'-stricKenter .ritorie.i juring the years immediately follo{oling 
do wa .r. , .Ill assessiag peae.::! time goals, Wallace stated: nAs part 
;)f t.he exfort to via be peace, I am hoping that what might be 
callEd tlla lever-narillal \lcanaey principle' can be establisbed 
ior anlllltDer of ccmmojitiasona world wide scale. U[ 9] 
:this p.lan IfOU.LJ. help to end f.luctuating prices in the 
;iho,rt. run an.]. wo uld~.! do type of .insurance po~icy for farmers 
in t .he 101l;j [UD. It. could be used in other areas such as 
f)etrole;.lm or caF~er Iu. ta the the same goals pursued. The Vice 
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President raali zed that.barr.ing a tragedy for produce.rs, 
(!spacial.ly fa I: meI's, condi tions were such th at a constant 
surplus would tE p.caduced which would put a strain on the 
con cept oft.ae E VeC-J1.l1:'Jld..i. system. Although Wallace was a 
staunch advaca tE of til.:! ever-normal system on a hemisphel:ic 
J.evel, he understoad ~.he need for additional mechanisms to 
insu.re a~ainst cootiaui:U. surpluses. He thought that the 
aemisphecic comllullity j·oii..L.d be able to sit down and eve,ntua.lly 
.ceach a consensus on decreasing production of certain items 
iuch as wheat oc cottaB.{lO] Wal~ace thought that all nations 
ilfould be able to uno.~rst:.lnd their long term .best iate.rests and 
wor k towar ds them toq~t ... 4i:!£. 
A tentative pldD to help ease the problem of over 
productio..u lias to r.aaiJ.;)cate resources so that i.nthe case of 
farm produci:sth,eJ:e iliou.1.d be fewer farmers producing staple 
:10ods. Latirl ADlericadfa.cmers could remain farmers but ins·tead 
;;,f p.roducing t'rcduct~wa.J..-ch could be produced throughout the 
ilemisphece, they shol11d cQuce.ot.cate on products w.hich were area 
specific SIlCil as tcapJ..cal fruits. Thus the United States might 
axcnaBge hec fC.r:.k, lard or flou.r for Latin American cocoa. 
4a.llace t.hought thia jj0l11d greatly benefit thewoeld community 
.:>ecauae: tt~n tErms o..t residual balance, the cost of such a 
peogrd. mdl be less t.h.d.n the financial .loss coming from 
demoriilized ra II IIIat~ r.1.d...J.. markets, needy producers and hungry 
consuillers. "L11 J 
OIl a wocId scale, -c1t.J..S plan could be used in many areas 
uesides agri.culture. ii>.!mispheric and world cartels could be 
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sat up and storagefaci.i..l.t.ies might be built insuring a greater 
.aaasure of statill.tl .iLil all raw material producing nations. 
';;onsenSl1S anwng all IU.t1.0as could be .reached benefitting the 
consumer as lIIEII d.:i t.11e p.coduce.r. Forging a consensus would 
.uH!dil that a.ll cla.s3es within the world community could 
llate.t.l.ally benefit. Co;)peration, order and good will ,vculd 
;illow experti.sE, tecaaolo.;JY and wo.tld resources to be put to 
t he best possiblE use,;». 
These were some o.i tbe Vice president's better defined 
!-llans dllrin~ this period.. While .he appears to have understood 
1.mpartant problems 1D t~e world economic order, his plans were 
still not co,uplE.teand .ole overlooked some fundamental problems 
fQr the scaemas. E i.cst, while reaching a Viorld consensus is 
c;>nceivdbly flOSS ible, it is ext.remely difficult to achieve 
.;!spec.l.alJ.Y .hen the .woc Id is divided .into two as it was in 
1941. Bven a bellispll';! ric consensus 'would have been difficult 
to achieve and md.l...:lta.:i..Il. During the war years~the Axis and 
Allied ~aillps wete continaallyco.mpeting for the all,egiance and 
raw iDattH~ia~s cftD.e 'E'hird Vorld nations. Even in Latin 
if. merica ,which lias iac.ceas.i.Dg ly considered by Americans to be a 
~phere of il1L IIlEnce andec her economic control, Axis inflUEnce 
.ililS 3t.l:0l1(l. Fez: llldny .La tin A merican countries such as 
iLcgentilid l dome stic ecodomic considera ticns superceded global 
politi.ca~ cOl1sidE.tatJ.ilns. Argentina continua~ly played each 
s ide off a9ainst tae other and hy wars' end, was ia the 
3tronges:t eCQ.ncllic posit;Lon of any country in Latin America. 
SincElia:tion-states are asually unwilling to relinquish power, 
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~ world ever-ooraal s,ste~ would have the same difficulties all 
!llu.ltinationa.i c:cgan4~(uaons have faced--it would have lackEQ. 
tile powecto enforce J.ts pelicy. This would be true of all raw 
material Legulating orq<.1nizations even those operat.ing 011 a 
ilemispher.1.c level.( 12S 
iiore illlp.ortant.iY. t.ilJ.s type of pIau demons;tratas Wallace' s 
inability tQ understand t.he dependent relationship between the 
United state3 aDd Lat.J.R American .nations, a dependency which 
iii as constanUy grow..\.n'l_ Latin America would decrease her 
i?J:oductioa ;,)f casie .foodstuffs and lioul.d .be sending 
llon'-essential luxurr .J.t.~lBS to the United states in return fo.r 
udaic Ioodstllffs. X.:1.i.S .. auld have increased the leverage the 
Uaited states would Aave aad over her Latin American neighbors. 
~ven duc~ng the Good Jeiqnbor era of the 1930s. the United 
3tdt.eS exaLted strong pressure through the use of ecoDomic 
J.acent,ives aLid pEJla.i.t..l.es. Had this plan been implemented, the 
Uni ted states weald ha va been able to use basic food items in 
the same manaez: as s,ae had used economic assistance programs; 
to exchaage :f0l: faVOrdJu.e political and economic condi·tions for 
American lldtiocals aaJ.t..a~ united states government.[13] 
The protection of rdlli material prices represented the Vice 
J?cesideat's most d~L.d.i.le:.i major hemispheric . plan at this ·time. 
tie had also ccnsidered other problems such as assuring 
prod uCtJ"iJil, c cn sumpt.~oa. and jobs for all indi viduals who 
desiredt.i.lella 
3tandard for 
Also, ole at adiedthe idea of craa ting a millimum 
all iad~viduals; however, these ideas had 
consideraoly mOLE l:Od..:Ja e.:igeswhen compal:ed with his plans for 
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.caw materials. 
iaL.1.ace felt tadt. there was a strong needior 
~ndeedeveloped natioIl3 to industrialize. Only by increasing 
lleallY indast.z:y aad dec.ceasing the number of individuals who 
remained III agricultl1.cec>iuld the hemisphere expect to better 
the Ii 11.1..419 conditions ior its under priviliged.iallace 
t.bo\Jght t.hat uIhe pea;;ess of industrialization is the way to 
attain a higher st.l.ada.cd of living. Everywhere th·ere are 
c;)mmunitiesthat must. increase their proportion of people 
engaged in illdust.ry .J.nd ceducethe number of people engaged i:n 
the production ct far~ products."[ 14] Por Wallace, one had cnly 
to studl l.iv i Dg coaJit.ions in developed nations to understand 
that industLializatioJ.l .ra;3the key to a better way of life. 
Acca.cding to Ii a.llace, tile responsibilities of the united States 
for Latin Am~rica weee qreat, and constant~y growing. The Vice 
.!?residenc r,aalized t.he effect of the united states economy 011 
<111 I..at~n ABaee iean n':ltJ.. ons and he understood that this 
3emi-depelldenttElat4onsilip was increasing as the hemispheric 
defense a~d ~ac fJepacat.1.ons grew. 
In tlleshoJ:t rllu, the united states lias responsible for 
cushi:>ning the sheCK at paace Which was still far off. Wallace 
. ce1t thdtOj COnCEllt4:.J. tJ..ll'i on production, the war would come to 
dn end more rapidly dad tile Latin America.n economies would have 
the fotential to deveiop taster. He stressed the need .for 
development Co.tforat.J.ons to be set up immediately in Latin 
i\.iaer ica, f illdncE d i.Ll pact with La tin American capital. The 
Jevalopment cCtEoratio.iloi would have the dual role of 
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~ggcessivelJ obtainiuj materials related to the war effort as 
w(!ll as activitieslIIlu.ch \lotlldbelp Latin American countries 
J:eadjust tneJ..r EccnOLilies .£.nthe post wa.c eca so that they could 
continua t.o produce .it~.,)ut interruption. This would increase 
tile speeJ. at which1.atia timecican industriali,zation would take 
place and the flan wOll.i.d be easily implemented.C 15] T.he idea 
seems tQ aave been Wa1.lace· s best economic plan and although it 
.as atil.l in its j.nia:acy at this time, it would be easy ·to 
Jrganize and cazxy out. 
licu..i.dCe' s.test defJ..a~d short term plan ilas in the field of 
~gricul~~re. The Vi~e P~esident was acutely aware of the poor 
;;onditiolls which Egisted in the mountains thcoughout Latin 
allier ica.lhasa f (op.Le WOi: ked long days and were barely able to 
Lee d t.hemsel yes as tb.a l:;itio of bushel per man hour work was 
l.iislDa~ll low. ial .... ii.ce recommended the use of better seeo as 
well as the ~otatioD of ~£ops which would result in an increase 
in the lie~d. That:o~mer secretary of Agricultuce ~asnot 
lI()rried about the afiect this plan would haYe on world 
dgricu~tural p.rices as it was his belief t11a t the increased 
f'roductlo.il would be c ;,HlsuiIled cather than e.xported.[ 16] This was 
do simple well defl-aea plan which was once again easy to 
implement and would ,sJ~iag about quickcesults.. It wou.ld allow 
the mouatain Fopu~at~ons to concentrate OB their other 
pt"olllems. 
il-is yeneral lOll., tet'ill plans were many.. First, iallace 
1esiced to USE a llll.xt.ilL'e of united states and Latin American 
<.: api ta~ and American £e3()UrCeS such as advanced technology a.od 
~x:pertise til dEvel;)~ L.a tin America. 
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He st .ressed the low 
intel:est rate eliviroftJllellt. for the industrial development. By 
S,) daiuj, t..he Vice Pra~ident believed that industrialization 
lould be broaght aboll' at a more rapid pacE.(17] While the Vice 
l?residellt dld net ;.Jld.D;) ra te on this flana tthe time I and 
~lthouga the plan lacKed detail, many flaws existed in the 
Jenera.! .idea. 
Fiest, maintaining a low inte.rest rate environment and 
~ttractiag private capital are usually contradictory. As a 
Jeneral :cule, the pciV'ate sector was only willing to accept a 
:celatiIH!ly lali' tata of return on an investment when the 
.... llVestmellt ilas close t;) risk free. Latin American in vestments 
~are usuCllly judged t.o be a grea ter risk than domestic 
i.n vestlileuts,ccnsequdntly venture and investment capital would 
only De a~tLactEd to J. Al.~h rate of return in Latin America. 
The p.ld,l1 appears .:..:) .a~ unworkable if it were to take place 
~xclusiveLJ 'hrou;h tAe pcivate sector. 
If the lew iat.ece;jt rate environment were to be 
,) aintained, fereig.tl 'i.)ve rnments, or the U.ni ted States 
Government.,.auld P1:voJd..i»J.i have had to create salle type of 
incenti ves such as loaa guaran tees, subsidization or tax 
~elief. The political climate of the time ~ould have made 
t.nese measures di-fiie uit. for the United sta tas to pursue. The 
Jnly alterDilt.ive 'M!ollld have been for Latin American 
;Jovern m~utal in tee vea tl. 0... in one of thes,e areas~ This also 
would have beenhighil 'llu.ikely as foreign .based corporations 
,Jper-atin~ within LatJ.n .Aruerica might have construed this to be 
46 
.;tIl infringellent of taeJ..1:' domain. These corporat.ions had 
..;onsiderable pOlieL in tae southern hemisphe.re and their desires 
,h:!ce usua.l.ly me t. 
A~so. if the U~L~ed states and Latin American governments 
\lere to jointly decide OD how development should take place 
c.ney wOI.U.d have had to Ld.4e an acti verole i .n the pia.nning 
~tages. This again ~o~ld have been difficult given the 
poli tied .... c~ima te ldu.cn la ter mate.ria.lized dnd would have 
a.ntagoni"ed business as it would ba ve meant intervening in a 
tcaditional business .:ipi1ece. In a short time, united states 
Jover.nme~t g.ro\th ;WclS Jla longe.r perceived as good. especially 
.;;ince the private secto!: vf the American ,economy "ias thought to 
119 responsiBl.e for tae then current: finaJlcia.1 health of t.he 
country_ libile tte Vice President did not seem to think the 
idea tilrouga clearli, ~e did not base all of his hopes for 
~atin America on this p~au. 
Althol1gil it .id,;~~d detail. one of Wallace's most 
Lnteresti.n 'J plans waa e.o set a minimum living standard for all 
tlle peoples Qf thellV4'ld. He ar guedtha t after the potential 
~bullcance ' of the w ')L~d was translated intaceal wealth and a 
~igh sta.nd~rd of livJ.~g. ucertain minimum standards of food, 
clothin~, and shelteJ: Otl:Ju t to be established, and arrangements 
~aqht to ~e madE to g~araBtee that no one should fall below 
t:ao3e3tandards."[ 13 j Tilis plan would have had a tremendous 
l.lllpact UPOD I.a ti n America as the average income for the bottom 
BO;' of the po~ul;it.l.on was considera.bly lower than the per 
capita fi::lures lIosto.f&:.en used by officials. Besides 
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;uarauteeing every Lndividual a decent living standard, the 
plan lIou.l.d have stim<.l.i.a.t.ej international trade and the flow of 
.:loads .tram indust~ia~~zed nations to the underdeveloped 
cOtlatcies. 
Xhe major Ilobla" JIIl-t.h attempting to initiate a plan such 
.»tandard;£t and which couJltl;ies were to pay a given percentage of 
the relief work. Theae t~o hurdles would have probably created 
d situat~on of ccnflict. rendering the plan unworkable. But 
the aav;,)cacy of ta!o!sce ~ypes of ideas made the Vice President 
increasingly patu1a.cLn L<itin America. 
Illo.cde.c tc avo.Li a J. ong term .l:e1i·ef effort which was what 
c.he above plan wOJ..J.d .Jlave created in the short run, Wallace 
also aiivvcatad the reduc£j"on of inequalities of income through 
the Ilse of fi~calpu.l4cy and social security type progJ:ams. 
;4 allace believed that tai.:; would ha vereslll ted in a higher and 
~ore stable demand i~c consumer goods and help smooth over the 
.;)0011 a..nd uust t}pe cycla which vas ever present in the world 
,~conomic community. He t.hought t.hat there must be a reduction 
in J'tue .iaeqilalitie:i ~.il ~acomas, so that a higher and more 
s ·table delland fer con..,Ulller s· <loods viII be attained .. ftC 19] The 
. , i'_·'" . 
t.heo.ry .oellind this pii£tl.Ca~ar idea appears to be sound bu t it 
seems tl1:itWallac;~ ildS ·over-confid,entwhen it came to putting 
theory into practice. :rae idealistic side of Wallace had not 
tet beea tempeL:Ed to 4Uf largE degree by his practical side. 
AS .fdr as Latin 4m.:u:: ... ca lias concerned, the wealthy classes 
.. auld Dotilave sat idle while their wealth vas being 
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cedistr.lDuted.. Att.b.e ioundation of the Good Neighbor policy 
lidS the pied.Je of DOd--intervention, a policy Wallace stro.ogly 
;lapp o.l:ted. Tilis iJeJ.ng t.he case, it would have been extremely 
difficult. foc ths Unit.€·j s ta tes to influence the Latin American 
joveraments in tnat. J.ll:ection. Although the United states 
;Jften iurnisned lI,aaYJ..d.t.ia America;D governments with financial 
~ssistance, in geoo.l:a1, it was the private sector which held 
i.llost :;).ftlle power in t.he eco.Domies of Latin America. It would 
deeiD that the flan to J:edistribute income would have greatly 
-i!adangered thefcsit.lon .If foreign businesses operating in 
l.atin A.ilhi~ri.ca. First, it would dry up the cheap source of 
l.abor wllich foreigll cJmpa.aies desired. Secondly, the plan as 
previausll statEd, _Juid .have antagonized t.be upper classes of 
Latin Amecican ~ociet.f... Foreign business ccnce.rns operating in 
';'>1tin AlAeLica weuld .l<iVe sidedwithtne upper classes since 
~his s€ij.illant. of socJ..ety lid,S essential in pr.oviding pJ:ofitahle 
opportuDitiestor .bus ... ness conce.rllS ope.cating in their 
countries. Althouqnthe plan sounded good, it would have had 
to face many instrmOUl1t<iDJ.e obstacles. 
AI10ther of ial.l.l.ce's roughly d,e.fined plans had to do with 
tradebacriers. He Dell..eJ'ed that trade cou.ld .be increased by 
jiliding iavestll€Dt. 411il...Jat ·the same time decreasiltgtrade 
.oarriers suca as tarJ.ffs. This would help enlarge markets for 
.Lnd ustLialized na tl.O as and 





ind.:tstrialized scci,ac.ies ... D the quickest possible manner.! 20] 
Altb.oug.;t Ii allace aq ain didnotelahora te on the fine 
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pOints of this ~lan, t~e theory behind it and the possibLlity 
to implement the IH.aa .as greater in compa.rison with many of 
ais otuer ideas. decaIJ.se this type of plan would have 
Jel,agated a gJ:eat deal oi responsibility to the pci vate sEctor 
a t the l:idJlle ti lie a1.101l4o ng the pri vate sector to realize 
cODsidera.oie pIGfits. it lIould have probably encountered less 
J:'esistance titan his .ltilar plans which were aimed at breaking 
c. .ue hold of the C01:p'.H:ate giants. 
At iiJ:st glance Lt appears that during this period Wallace 
..-as ad1/ocating a ·coIl<:jioiilclcate of loosely related plans in the 
dchievement of two nasLc aims. At the fOI:efront of his mind 
.as the yoal of iii inn.l.llg t.aiewar. After that .half of the battle 
was aclu..eved the i:paJ.. was winning the peace; creating a.n 
ocdel:ly hemispheric d.ad l..1ter on world economic order. Wit.h no 
stable peace" there C;)1l1d be no progress. The war miglitbe won 
~~icklJ, howevEI, if ~he peace was not fought for. and von, the 
11 ictory on the b:a ttJ.t! fj.e~ds would not be of any benefit to the 
COJllllCD illcill. While d.J..i. ilL the Vice President's ideas ' attempted 
t;) alleviate the tiuct.1ations in production as well as in 
consumption, no oiec-dll >itrategy appears to be evident in the 
ceaiizatJ.oIl of tbe.i~ ciilllS. However, u.pon closer examination, 
ilallace's ideas fit iato a discernible pattern during this 
fJ~riod. 
In .ilis .;ipeech at £iay 1942# Wallace stated: fI_._the century 
which wU .. l come out o.ct.u",s war--can and must be the century of 
tile common maD. Ewei:' fWDt! re the common man must learn to .build 
ais own J.ndustries iiLth h.i.S own hands in a practical fashion. 
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£verjwllare the C.)fI1I1O,u man must learn t.o increase his 
j;JrotluctivitJ so that lle. aad his children can eventually pay to 
the ~or~d ~ommuDit, a~L that they have received."[21] This 
j.lassage lIIdS~t t te coce o.i Henry Wallace's economic and social 
taearj. Hi;;; "Cellti.u:y o.f the Common ManU speech, which was 
~robably his most faulIJus, connected all of the loosely related 
plaas ae h;id ad voc .~t.aJ., and articulated the basic philosophy 
jJellind his iJiuep.rint f o.c ilorld prosperity. 
AccQrding to ial.Lace, industrialized na tions were under a 
ilh)cil a.oiigaticnto heJ..p less developed nations industrialize 
witnout taking advd.nt.:lg~<;).f them. He argued that tf ..... there 
iIlustbe neitheL llil.l.r.acv nor economic imperialism. n(22] In the 
Long run, deve.lc~ing .:.u.t.ions would be able to pay .back the 
d.ssistance wAich they rec~iV'ed from the industrialized nations. 
r ilis !II oU.Ld also 1:rin:t dilO'ut long term prosperity for the 
.i..Itdust.ci.i:L~ized wcrld d,3 developing naticns would be able to 
Jurchase ~Qre fiuisa~d products from the highly developed 
countries. ThIOU'l4 tiU! private sector a.ad under government 
3apervision,t.hE Il0I:.J.J cOllld achieve undreamed of prosperity. 
Pree dom from wan t lI;)llld '3nable the vorld popu.la tion to educate 
itself and. tlris liculd res.11t in the Epread of democracy.(23] 
A.II of the ~laa3v.a ien Wallace advocated during this 
p e.I:" lod co Jld fit La to r.his package, i.n quest of freedom from 
.ant.. Alt.holl~ll€ach pIau was difficult to implement on its o:wn 
:ilid couldllot achieve t .. e long run o.bjecti vehy itself, Wallace 
;:;eems to have believ~d t.&ldt if all the ideas liere worked out 
3im\llta.il~.ously, ther wOllld not be as difficult to implement. 
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All of tue Flalls were gedced towards borrowing from the well 
() fffor tha hen·eil. t aithe poor until such time as the poor 
could stan d on their ,lila 1: eet and eventually repay t.he well off 
industr ia.lizad na.tion ... 
iall.aCe's thOUqdtS Oil. Good Neighbor dif10macy at this time 
iit into the ~iheral Je~ Jealer consensus on foreign policy 
l.ssl1esconcerning thaaeJlisphere. However, this point of view 
WdS .not s.nared bJ tile ma.j:;lrity of those empowered to formulate 
£or~ign tlo.l.icy_ ialld.ce· S .beliefs did net yet resemble the 
ideas a_J assumltio . .us iJl "he mainstream of American foreign 
tl0licy. ;lost l:esp0.ilsl.£u.e for this rift was the fact that the 
..iood Nei';lhhor fclicywas never thorollg~hly or carefully 
delineated and t.llu.:i lifd.::i subject to the inte.rpret.ations of 
J..l.beral politicians such as Wallace v,lrious policy Ilaker.::i. 
.;:;ould stress tlE lle ;~d for patience v.hich was nece.ssary to 
~aintaining a nei9h~grlJ celationship while more conservative 
thia.kers emphasized t~e concepts of the "open door" and 
L:eciproc.itYlMilich seemi4-.l1y justified hars.her actiolls when 
American ~ishes ieee uo~ ~et_ 
AJ.t.llough ial1ace never sided with the co.nserva·ti va 
tainkers,ilis FOSJ.:J;ioll.;i regarding various aspects of 
aemispheric foreign polJ.cy most resembled those of mainstream 
americdllforeigD po.u.c y .J..i1 his mature period which began after 
Jlis £1ayt942 speEch. iule his thoug.ht grew more conservative 
Juri.ay tais later per.Lod, mainstream American foreign pelicy 
-Ldeas moved toward.;i t..n.e center. The war was partially 
cesponsible for thi.3 sa.:Lit as tie Boosevelt administration 
tlercelved a need 
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intensive hemispheric solidarity 
cnroughout the tiat .aiiort. More important~y, just prior to 
ArneI:' ican lavo1 vemellt in tbe war and throughout the eaclywar 
jaa.r;sl fareign pelicy decl.siens .tega. .rding latin America were 
aot left e,iclusiveJ.i loU the realm of the State Department. A 
gee ater Bllmher ot li;j~ raJ.. Ne w Dealers began taKing pa.rt in 
faraign palicy decision making a_d they had a "softening" 
~fi€ct oapoliey iormald.i.J..on. As the war prcqr>essed, however, 
C~le impet1Js of liDarQ.ls regarding foreign policy decisions 
4ilned_i2<i J 
\iall.ace brought .;.l.l.()f these generalized ideas forvard in 
.tay 19,42 witlltiE fet:voJ: of a .religious leader. Iie maintained 
.Ilis .faita ill thE free eat:.i!rprise system despite warninqsfrom 
llis e.lose pe rscnaJ. fr .. e nd and former Ambassador to HSlCieo l 
Josepllus l.>aniels. U.:1Iu.eJ.s, who was the Ambassador during 
.; allace' s v is it to tie.i:J.co had Ilnusually liberal views for an 
()ffieer of tne State J)ejlaa:tment. In his lette.r to Wallace 
;:lft ,ar the ViceEJ:esident had retu:r:nedfrom the inauguration in 
.1exieo,uanials s td tel t.lu t it was imperative to monitor the 
J.ctions of ~arge c()r;p~r;:itions as they would probably uAdo all 
tile g;)od which had bean done in the last eight years.[25] 
AILd,\)llga .. allaea cont inually spoke of the century of the 
commen man aud hi.;; quest for freedom, his ideas dur.ingthis 
~eriod £~cusad en ecoao~ic matters rather than on political 
ilcoblems. aut eve.il in this relatively early period in which 
ll.is thoa~hts a.nd ideas ilex:e geaera..lly rough, it appears that 
Ii i111ace bad rEilc . Ilei t.lu: conclusion that nothing construc-ti v,e 
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':::;ll1id be done on a pO . Lic.lcallevel until mate.rial needs were 
llet. He o\ltlined this part of his theory in greater detail 
~hoctli after his May 8 speech. In the quest to obtain tasic 
illd.terial necassiti.es tal: the poo.r, Wallace attempted to inspire 
faith. TilLS is tart Qfwaat made him so popular, especially in 
l.atin Ameri-ca. All aiuis speeches and articles attempted to 
cap tU.1:e the spir it ;().t aad for progress. Altha ugh his ideas 
concern.i.4l':lLatin American-United states relations had not yet 
tally-matured, Wallac3 lldIJ. reached his zenith as an orator and 
thisaelj;Hdd h.i II tc reC8J.. 'Ie notice in the intecnationa.l arena .. 
Ue ..J..ai:er 'IILotet.,) <i iciendregardingthe first time he had 
lleardliil.lidlll Jennillq;;a fJi::il an speak, wh.ich was in Des Moines on 
t.ae 5ubjt:!ct of pr":>aiol.c.iOll. This was before the days of 
i.oadspea'~rs and despLte >lei.ng on the outskirts of a large 
crowd, wal.lace llO ted t.tH t Bryan could make himself heard. 'Iilis 
is .hat .l.lItpressed Wlll.lace most about the great orator. 11 I,D 
t.hose a.ays Iha.:l 110 use for oratory and was not too 
aathusiastic anont BJ:fall>leCaUSe .I t,houghtha appealed too much 
t.othe emot.ions and dOt. enough to the intellect.. I think much 
moceof Bryan teday tAaa i did thirty years ago. ftC 26] Although 
wallace w.rote thisia l:lii5, it appears that the Vice President 
.:lad leacIled t..he lessJD lit uch earlier.. At the end of his 
uCantucy o.t the COUllllOll Man" speech,iallace stated: "The 
J?eople' s .reyo~u tien i:,i on the march, and the dey i1 aad all bis 
an(~als cannot ~Ievcll.i aqd.inst it. They cannot prevail, for O.D 
the side oftha feopl~ loS the Lord_ .... stronq in the strength of 
the Lord, ile llhoil.qJlt, in the people's cause will neYerstop 
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llotil t.o..tt cause is .,;)A. ef( 27} 
• 
!AI1942-1946: MATURED THOUGHT 
I4hi.le part of Heurv a. Wallace's energies were always 
focused on the wac ef"::ort and related issues, the amount of 
thougat devoted to taa poat war world and the plight of the 
.l.ess developed COUllt..tJ.e.;i increased and matured. The goals of 
~ndin~ hanger, ItcyidJ.llSi housing for all, adequate medical 
treatment., jobs and prJsperity for eveI:yone, never changEd .. 
Hilwever,the means to achJ.~ve ·these ends were under constant 
'3cr Jtiuy as the VJ..;;e .r resident at tempted to bring about 
prosperit.y in a pract.l.c.:11 fashion. 
lhe century cf tile cammon man was to be an industrial and 
initially materiall, o.c ... ented re velutionrather than a social 
oue.IJildustrial pro(Jcess is at the foundation of Wallace's 
illtimate goal. of deJlocc'01cy. A country must have the capacity 
to p.codllce in. order to ilravide the basic necessities such as 
food and sllelteJ:. Wallace believed that only after these needs 
!u. va be«:!ll lie t COGl.l aa underdeveloped coun try begin to 
~stablis"l a tx: 11E democracy _ The mos·t important prerequisite to 
true democracy is an edllcated population. It is only when 
LDdividuals dre able to understand the various alternatives and 
i.lilVe sufficient time to .Cil oose, that true democracy exists. .In 
·.)cdarto educate a.:;iye~ pepula·tion notenly must their basic 
aee ds be met, but they illU.., t also have the free time and excess 
'::9sourcas t() dElate '0 .euucation. Wallace believed that it is 
aacessary to start ~ich industrialization because the 
load ustrial izat iOIl proce.:is historica.lly has a limiting affect on 
j:lopillation g.coith. fais ef.fect allows resources formeLly used 
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i{)r basic necessiti.es ,;;)f an expanded population to he used 
elsewileJ:C! suc.h as in&he field of education. !lThere is a 
.>eell1in9 coaflictbetweea freedom and du.ty, and it takes the 
spirit of democracy tJ resolve it. Only through religion and 
education can the .treej em loving indi vidual realize that his 
Jceatest pri~ate flea3ure comes from serving the highest unity, 
tne ;,Jelleral welfare ilL all. This truth (is) the esse.Dce of 
lemocracl ••• Demccracy i& the hope of civilization. H[ll The 
.>trategj used to iJldu~tr.i.dlize and eventually democratiz·e Third 
~ 1)rldn:.ition.s involve tile already industrialized world. 
The coopeJ:ation ,.:If cae industrialized world is essential 
to Wallace's industJ:ial~zatio,n blueprint. The industrialized 
.aat ions, predoilinant1l t. ,llA:ough the private sector, loan the 
.laderdevel.oped natioil tae expertise, advanced technologies, 
seml.-ii1U.shed goods ",ad o.ther resources necessary t.o the rapid 
industriali~dticn ai &he underdeveloped nation. Tbese 
reSi}UrCeS dl:e tlellCepa.i.d aft.er the undeJ:developednation 
industrid.lizes suffJ.-::iently. "Older nations will have the 
privil€ge to help yoallj;:J: nations get started 011 the path to 
lndustrializaticn."i.ll B~fore industrialization takes place, 
aoweveJ:, certain conaJ.tioas must exist within an unde:rdeveloped 
aatiOll. 
T.he tliO lIost iJlpoL>Lan t ~lemeRts necessary to Third World 
indllstrializaticn a.ea aconomic and political sta.bility. 
Ecoaomic stabilit.f is essent ial if an underdeveloped countJ:.Y is 
to attJ:act £<>['eign cJ.pi teLl. Wallace believed that without 
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,;ilJf ficient pcl vate f~i:eign capita.l the industria.lization 
~I:ocess would beteta.&:ded. Political stability is needed to 
iasure that the eX.Lstl.nlj c api tal ,capi tal which usually cculd 
not .be reiDovad easily, is safe-guarded against des·truct.ion .. 
wallace realizes thai;.tlle .resources necessary to industrialize 
<in (lnderdevelopEd COu..iltry will not be provided by the private 
3ector UD.l.ess staD.ia pOLl. tical and economic environments exist 
.ithin tnt! COUlltt} Dl;U119 developed. After the stability is 
achieved, planning mar De~in. 
According to wallace, flanning is essential to an orderly 
aco BclOic system whet£h!r tae system be in the United States o.r 
kilt in America. However, the Vice president opposed a p.lanne.d 
economy_ "I aill against a planned economy_ It means that all 
econemic decisiens .woald be made by a small group· at a central 
spot. It. iDea.us tyra.aaly.Nevertheless I favor planning."r 3] 
rne role o£ tl:.s A;aecican government is to 
;ODCellt.cat ioa while p rOlD'.) ting free enteq:.rise .. 
wor.kagains·t 
This will, 
ilBong ot.uer things,oi.Ll':h' Latin American nations to better meet 
t.heir fla.as for indllstrl.aJ..ization since they will be able to 
cOGrdinate their PJ.;illS rather than .having their 
.i.ndustrial iZ;:lt iGll lJJ.uep~ int dictated by a powerful 
aialtina·tiona.l cotpucation. Wallace stated t.hat "Eco.Domic 
freedom re':luiresthat ecoJlomic decisions should be .. as much as 
tJossib.le not conceau:a ted, but di.ffused ..... 1 approve every 
Jovernmental measure wn.Leh promotes and energiZes private 
ownership and <lperation and enterprise .. fI[ "] Although Wal.lace 
rea~izes that other J..ndastrialization plans exist during this 
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pariod,:Lt is his bel~ef that t.his is t.he mostcea~istic as 
~ell as t~e fastest. 
Wallace thcught that if this plan were to be implement.ed 
~orcectll it ~ould no, ~ntagonize any single class and would be 
'Jood fOl: all in tile iJnq CUD. capitalism is potentially tbe 
Jest means of ach.L~vin." industrialization and is part of a 
"Considered in its essentials, 
iwwever, capi talislll Ci:l}1 be the most efficie.nt system of 
.>cgl.ni.ziu.;j l'rod ~c tiOA and distri,bution on principles of freedom 
aad eqdal DppoItun~ty let devised by man.D[S] Each class 
.cealize:i .:iuDstantial.aeaeiits proving that class intecests are 
ia har meay with each ->tllec _ . 
The £0.:ei9n capLtd~J.St. is able to realize many s.hortterm 
~rofits which aLe eS~dat:L4l to its health. Also, by brinqing 
4bout a moce 1:1.g11Ll .i.adustrialized community, the f()rei gn 
cdpi ta~ist 1.s incce.J.sLlq the purchasing power of an 
underdeveloped natioa . .i.il the long run.. This, according to 
4allace, will create ,.1 ~d£qer long-term e.xport market. The 
&lites within a deva13ll.!L.ng count4¥ are able to mai.ntain their 
3tatus dlld . iacrease tole.l.cwealth assuming they share in the 
~ouDtrl's ~callomy. .LUt-ilLS matuce period, wallace is no longer 
fighting ~ealth by atte~pting to redistribfrte it, rather he is 
attamptiag to €nlarqe t.ae pie. "r am preaching no warfare o.n 
wealth. t·(6] A~l goYe . .:ament.s involved, as well as t .be common 
J1an,iul1ld su~p\l;;jedLY benefit from Wallace's mature 
Lndustri~li~dticn plaa. 
The anited Stated ~Qyernment ~ould greatly benefit from 
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this p.J..d.D. as she .';\lll.1.d gain closer political ties within the 
aemisphere. Thus tile Giloa Neighbor policy would be furthered 
as hemisp.l1eric scliaaritl would .increase. Foreign. qovernmellts 
ii>lllid halfe a mate sat .l.sfi~d populatio-n w.hieh would iacrease 
3tability .both fclitl.';d.l.l 'f and economically.. Also, the foreign 
:l0vern Iteut wiluld gaia pre~ ti geboth domestically as well as in 
the international COilllBUnl.ty. A government could hoast that it 
4as resPGnsi~le for creating a better environmeat for its 
i?oplllati..o.n. Finally .ind iIlost important.ly, the common manfilould 
.aaginto have the cualiee of material security. This lieuld 
.anable 11ill to 1 eaL.l. ze educational opportunities so t.hat he 
cou Id thell ea.joy a bet tar way of life, a democz:a tic way of 
.life. "Eor the IIElfa"e of -the American peop.!e and the world it 
.LS .avell lioce .i lit crtant to in vest four billicIJ dollars in the 
l.adustI:ial iZ:it ic:noi 4nd.erdeveloped areas ill the so-callEd 
uacltw<lLd nations, thecEDY pJ:omoting the IO.Dg-tarm stability 
tilat comesfrctl da evec-increasing standard of living. This 
ilould llot 011.1Y .eE! goaJ. po . a..itics and good morals.. It would be 
;Jood Dusi,J1es3. tI[ '1 J 
~hroughout his career as Vice President, Wallace would 
find lIauy eXdl1lples wllic.ll .::onvinced him that his plan lIould 
lIlarK.In eve~J aceJ. of {Jnited states-Latin American contact, 
tlrogress was continually apparent. By the time Wallace became 
-,l1e secreta.cy cf COlilller~e, he reached matu~ity as a political 
'jCielltist. .In this j)d.I:.LOJ. he focused almost exclusively on his 
.. n.sic the.:JI:et.ical p.Laa and its practical applications rather-
than tIle lIIor~ idealic3c.ic plans for Latin American developllent 
of his ~a:tl.ie:t period.s. 
t:nrougn the erivate ::ieCi;Il':. 
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He .began with industrialization 
III most .instanc.;!s c..ala pri vate sector had an expertise 
;lam.itched .by the govern lie nt and it was for thisceasoll cou.pled 
~ith ~allace's generaL th~ory on the role of business in the 
aemispheret.aat 1;e coasistently sought to expand development in 
~atin A~erica throa~h ~he private sector. fllf a joint 
<lnte,tprise (Jtilizilly Pezuvian resources with North American 
lIHteLiais, techIliqae, and know-how, and with joint 
Per llvlan-Uniced states f.J.nancial participation can · be set up I 
.::ihare tlle POLBt of Vl..Hf oi many in this country that such a 
Jlet.hodlllllu.lJbe IlU tilil1.J.1 ad valltageo us and would be a real step 
forward 1.11 a pta.ctic,;l.J. liemonstration of .being really good 
lleighoors."{3] 'thus it appears that Wallace had, to some 
~.i(tent, ~i.\f€.11 uJ; cn d. .~v·i3L.lping the southern hemisphere in a low 
interest rate His aew position stressed 
develofill~lit ;;)ut al1"lIad .f..)rthe private sector to realize t.be 
prof.its it d<!sired. r t S'3ems that Wallace allowed th·e business 
o;;()mmunitl lloref.te~d;)at bu.:. only when the pIivate sector would 
meet it~ obligatioas tJ industrialize the world in rapid 
f ;lsbion. 
Alt.houg,a the prl.vat~ sector was primarily responsible for 
the development of I..at.4n America, the governme.ut was to 
s~pplemeat American ~dS1uass in many areas. Wallace maintained 
.ais pcs~tio.d on til.! eAportatio.n of technology and expertise 
f .rolll his eariier perl..)ds. The uni ted states had proven that 
she coald prodtlc.e capi.:ily in war time and t.ha Vice President 
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could see 110 ceaseD 'lI.il'l t..:.e high .level of production should .Dot 
ae mai.ntail1€'i duting peace time as well. Nowhere vas this more 
\~videntt.ndnin the £ .... eld of agriculture. Even after Wallace 
.L<!ft the Def>d :ctlle,nt of A':lriculture to become Vice President in 
1~41,ha st.1.il kept :i clo,:;e eye on the actions taken by bis 




l emonstra ted his loa.j 
~ro,Jlems_ "I talldd. 
i.:ei.ated to Latin America. Wallace's 
JSDA trainees hound for Latin America 
t~ cm outlook when con fronting verld 
t>l the Latin American trainees about 
conservati.on of land, water, grass and trees, wildlife and 
.ainecals. I pointed .;)ut "he need for doing this on a sustained 
field .basis without axploitatio.n by American coyot.es. I 
pointed out that tai! &echnique of sus·tained yield could be 
learned and .;i~ould be appl.ied as soon ·as pos.siolefor the sak€ 
af tile enti.re heilliaphe.ce. ft[ 9] These types of progLams lIer€ 
d.dvoca teci tlu:o ug .haut the political career of Wallace. A~t.hough 
J.n ilis maturE thaugllt Wallac€ reduced the role oftbe 
;j3Vernment i.o his pli111io£ hemispheric indus·trialization, the 
jovernment sti.ll had Ji<lnl duties. 
In the eccnomic ,held, one of the primary objectives of 
t.he united S·ta tes GOil3m.Gk!ntwas to formulate a policy ilhich 
.ould maintain a 
opportunitiea atIoad. 
achieve this gcal 
,;ita ole domest:ic economy and increase 
According to Wallace, the best way to 
.a.ifor the govexnment to decrease trade 
aarriers. "The sound fld.Y to develop an expanding foreiglltrade 
is to ~ower the O.J. r1: i~ rs which Obst.Cllct the international 
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1iI0VanteIlt 0 .£ Joods andt,aa Reciprocal Trade Agreements Program 
provides il Jcadual 3~lective method for accomplishing this end 
.itiloilt seLiolls dislocdt;ivD to our economy. "(10) It mus·t .be 
empbasi~ed that the fan~ing as well as the technology were to 
.ae provJ.ded a.lmcst a~clusL vely through the private sect.or. 
As a geaeral rala, ~allace wanted the government to take a 
~as3ive cole in feme traditional business s pheres.. It was cnly 
when the private sector CQuid not or would net meet the needs 
of the economy tha, tlle government s hollid step in. The 
iivailabi.lity of credJ.t :;»eLves as a fine example. Wallace 
tho \lght that "Gavsl."a lIent funds should he em,ployedonl y if 
dosolutaJ..l necessa.ry, ill lihich case t .hey should be used not to 
3upplant h4t mereLy to supplement e.xisting sources of 
cce dit. ·'(11] 
In oth.ar are.;lS W.'1..llace pursued a greater degree of 
:J0vecnmant intetient.a.on, .however. the paramount goal was to 
keep the private sect~r ~aalthy. Not only did Wallace voice 
concern ovec LEstU:;tivd business practices, but he also 
ilorried aDQut cut thraat. competition. Very early on, the Vice 
presilient .&:eali2ed tua pJtential role air travel would play in 
the post war society. Wallace desired to utilize this 
ddvanceJllent in the bes~ manner possible and he advocated an 
.a.nte.cJlatl.onal ait dutaoi:it. y in order to regula te what would 
probably .become a f.a.our.Lshing industry in · the post war world. 
He thoug-at tiJat ~ollla tum;;» should be granted monopo.lies on 
certain ai~ tcute~ aa this would rid the industry of 
Jastructive competitioD dil d concen tration .. [ 121 
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Ii h,U.ethe Vice j;lc~si dent was always an advocate of 
~usiness hea~th, ha a04 held a more conservative stance 
cegardiB~ tha way in w.l1i\,;h Latin American industrialization 
3hould De achieved. ~n order to bring to bring aboat 
.l.udustcidl.izat.icn mor~ rd~idly, Wallace was willing-to ignore 
some of the abtSa3 at the private sector. Government was to 
~ake a rddct.l.Ve rather t~~n an active role in many spheres. 
rhus the role of govecnmeat vas to examine existing problems of 
the free eate..rprise systeJl and to formulate policies which 
.4 auld d.J.J.Otl the prl. VaLe sectoc to function more freely with 
.i.e.s S pLoolem,;i. "I fd VO£ f)lanninq to make t.he Amecicaneconomic 
;.ilstem icee-er thaJl lot. is today. tI[ 13] Tbe government should 
react tv its enviLonmdnt. only taking an active role in most 
:,Jco nomic sPdeceswA~ .n 
so. The private sect~r 
~usiness was unwilling or unable to do 
could then build upon governmental 
activity_ UBy servinqthe general welfare in this manner, 
::l;)varn.m<:!ut. is not dell I i.l1q free pri vate enteLprise. Rather it 
is proviJing a st[onq~c dad surer support for ·economic progress 
'lnd anaxj;>a.uding ecoaolilY. ~I ( 14 ) consequently, government would 
::lllaraatee l;)ans to .l.;ll.:iuce confidence and it would also sUffly 
cceditllhdB t.he (I:i Velt.e sector was unwilling. This helped to 
insure pei vate SEctor ae tl. vi ty and growth. 
Wallace rEalizej taa t the private sectocmust remain 
aeal thy espec.ially if lot was to successfully industrialize 
.l.iltin America. Oni.l.K.e .4.4 s earlie.I: thought, the Vice Pcesident 
;,lckncw..leJ~ed thE fact uat the war could be a catalyst in 
uringin'l about cl()s~r tlemisphecic ties. Fcr Wallace, the war 
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"'as a cht.iaceto expaad ae.dlispheric trade and general contacts 
;)n a.LI .levels ill thaltem ... sphere. Expanded trade opportunities 
IOl1ld hopefullj l:es~lt. ~ll more con tact with Latin Americans a.ad 
30 the i~ce Presideat. att.empted to bring about stro.ng business 
ties lIIitilin t .he £elu.3pheri~ i ,Q area s in which the government was 
to coordLuate. 
Foc ta~s rEason. ial~ace as chairman of tbe BEW, advocated 
mai.!ltaining impoI:tin:l and exporting firms in the picture rather 
·than having a 90V~i:niDeat monopoly.[ 15] iallace felt that the 
Jov~rnm~Jl:tlIti9ht I:estrict its operations in the post war era 
c1nd retreat fU:lIta.ad.qqressivewar time policies it would no 
l.onge.c aeed to pursue. Tae private sectOI: an the other hand, 
could use the CO.ii4:..:LCt it would gain during the war in a 
construct.loire manner <J,Jld Wvuld aot be subject to the political 
climate ;witAin the united states to any gcea,t degree. While 
~ccordia~ to the thea~ec~cal model, all classes of individuals 
i()uld .il~nef it, iall.:i.ce understood that the possibility for 
'louse a.Xl.stad. 
This possibility fv.c a ,Quse pushEd Wallace away from his 
:<!dclier baliaf that alt.cuism could exist in politics. Unlike 
ais former plans and positions in which individuals or groups 
aad a Yloral cbligatioa to act in a certain manner, Wallace 
udsed moce of his lIlatare · choug.at on power politics. While l;e 
;aaintained his idEas QU lIlarai obligation, he more oiten focused 
011 interest groups aill :t.l1~ir role in t .he industrializatio.D of 
l.:ltin Allerica. Ncwhecew.:is this more evident than in Wallace's 
'i laws on labor. 
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The ideas cftedLs'tXl. .buting wea,lththrough fiscal policy 
,ind social secuJ:ity t.ype program.s were placed on the back 
.aurner durin.j tlds peciod as wallace focused more on interest 
jroup pO..J.itics • For t.ll~ first time, Wal.lace acknowledged and 
.:t :cceFt-ed class ill'terests ;ind he attempted to formulate policies 
~hich would maintaid at~bility and be in the interests of the 
Ii or king clas:3 as liell. as the capitalist class .. 
WaLLace .believt;;ltllat the working class was at the 
~o\llldation of a jeulOcratic way of life .. nTheworkinq 
l?opulation of the cOll~iaea t is t .he stroDgest and the only 
~afeguard 01 democracy a~aiDst fascist invasion from abroad or 
fifth column activity fro~within."{ 16] A strong working class 
jlJ ould a.a1.e to lil.a wore from the capitalist c .lass and thus 
lnc.rease the purChaS.i.llg p.)lier in the poorer segment of Latin 
American society_ 11150 a strong working class would help to 
J.Dcreaset..he spEed at wa.ich industrialization would take place 
.iince tals cJ..a~ss lia.illsaally found in the cities aad demandEd 
;aor·a CO.Jl3Umer goods "han. the rural individual. A greater 
demand .tar COnSUleI: ..Jood.:.t meant an expansion in the industrial 
.;ect.or. 
,It appea.rs that dallace now believed that an interest 
i .couP type political 3trac ture would be the best vehicle on the 
eoad to indu3trializdtion. He seems to imply that all classes 
.!lild theix3elf-i.Dt~.:est at heart and in order to .bring about 
iadust.ri~izaticD. a Di1t~on had to build up those segments of 
s.;)ciety which would propel it into a more advanced age. A 
tlrosperi.!lg WGr king cl.d.S.:iW auld. then help the poorest segment of 
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tone Iaatl.D American S()CLet. y. T.he theory scmewha·t resembles the 
competin';j interest 'qe.ll1p notion (pluralism) later developed by 
}olitical scientists ;,iuch. as Robert Dahl. 
This ne_ tteor,V aad lllany ramifications for other positio;ns 
·j:;tliace held. In ius mat.are period, Wallace attempted to help 
the working class ;it t .. he same time he aidEd the capitalist. 
unlike t.ile Mar:lists, oIal.lace did not see an inherent conflict. 
'l f itlte~est. bEt weet"\ til'd classes hut instead believed that a 
com men interes te liste d ll<;!tween the capitalist and the war ker. 
:;It111e eJCp.loLtaticn ~oald. sometimes benefit the capitalist in 
t.he short tua, in th"! lOilq run the \!Iorkers and the capitalist 
were depende,nt upon. eacu other. Interest groups would insure 
sta . Jility as .Ie 119 as&.ne y. did not ganq up to exploit other 
.1.nterest -jI:OUps. ·'.it (i.3] a mistake for agriculture and labor 
to gang ap against cd.pitaJ., or for agricu.lture and capital to 
::l an 'J up ay aills t la.boc. Itt H ] 
As 41lexdJ[Fle, ' lia.J..lace focused on tbe rubher workers in 
ilio. ·Jounsoa and JoaaSOJl which oWlled one of the rubber. plants 
.Lon Ri.o during liiorl.d ~ar TWO, payed their work.ers three times 
..:&igher tlla:R ,)the[ .o.c~ers doing similar work elsewhere in the 
cit y..In addition# t.ne ccmpanyfurnisheda substantial n'oon 
flleal to all of tie ~a..}o~ers. All of this was o,bviously of 
jr'eat aeaefit tc til~ · vO.ckers as they could now afford mO're of 
tile necessities cf li~e alld receive a better dist.. But the 
plan aided JchnsoB aad Johnson as well. The workers at this 
particular plant tllru>!d out five times as much per person as 
worxers Join] the sailli! ae similar work in 1110 .. [ 18] ForWa.llace, 
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&.tiis waSCllllcretE eVJ.J.ellC~ that his type of plan CO\1~d work. 
Latin America couJ.d iuJustrialize rapidly through a middle 
course, socLalist dad £ascist alternatives vere poor by 
~olllpariso.ll. iihile aJ..~ mature plan was somewhat more 
conservative, Wallace W&1S still perceiVed as a radical idealist 
.ilthough he aid not parce.J. va himself as such. 
i aU.ace neller ueiie Yed himself to bE a radical primarily 
;')~Ciiuse he alvdY£ advocated the solving o.f problems throllgh the 
dystelll. .,llile l:a often advoca ted reform, he never pursuEd 
cllangas ill tile systi:!m itse If. His faith Ln capitalism remained 
.lDshaka.a...i..e thrcugil;:htt. iu. s caree.r. "I am no t the glamorous 
cevclationcu:ythat sGiIleJ10stile commentators seem.to .be tryi.ng 
to persuade ~e that I aill. Here, as usual, I am simply adopting 
..>ld American practice.:ito new Americannaticnal problems .. tt{19] 
dis political philoso9hy ~as based upon ethical practices which 
()ccasioaa..l~y had to a~ oroken. For the most part this ethical 
iramewoJ.:kwdS used ia con.junction . with an American sense of 
fairness .so that th.e oIhl.tla world would prosper dnd not just 
.:iegments of J..t. 111 lU .. S maturity as a world poli ,ticiau, Wallace 
~nderstooJ tbe fcssiD~a pcoblems and abuses Which occurred in 
t ile tree eateI:ftisa system. His faith ill the system remained 
despite the fact tnat Wallace continually encountered 
l:ii t llat.i.OL1S 1..11 wbicu ~Duse was evident. his plan was not 
Je.riect, Dl1t Wallace Je.lid ved that it held the best ,chancefor 
.3!lccess duriag an Erd h~A.nev would be difficult. 
iallace lfas aOIl i.atimately involved in .Latin American 
.;.1 ff airs dndae realizdd that solving the existing prob.iems 
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",auld De a difficult task.. Althougllhe was pleased wit h the 
-'lam isphac.ic30lida.cic.fwtu,ch he understood to be a combined 
.cesult oi the Goed ~diglllJ;)r policies and, more importantly, the 
~ ar effort, the Vice ?resident worried about the course 
aemispharic relation;;» w.)uld take after the war ended. "Once 
the wal:' i.::iovrer 1 antic~pd.te ·t.hat Latin America will cause us 
iliore diffi.culty tl1iUl most people would now believe 
posaible. fir 2 J) 
Altllo(lga Ii al.lace pOJ.n ted out many successes in Latin 
AJler iean devrelcillent ue was not unawa.re of existing prcblems • 
.ioi1le of taese pLcblam3 J.eJ. Wallace to guesticn someoft.he fine 
~Jiat~ of nis ~laas. fAis is best exemplified by the ongoing 
dilemaa "'0.[' dallace J:d9drJ.ing which type of government could 
Jiest lead the Ld.tJ..ft American nations during the 
LDdustrializaticn pLacess. 
Wa..i.i.ace t.hco9ht thd.t genuine democracy could only be 
<J.ttdinej after the pl:!;)ples of each country were sufficiently 
:.lducatej~ An il.J.J. tee<l te population often permitted 
.ceactiolldcies to iJ.'l4t conservati ves for political office. 
Even wben pr;.)gre~siv::');3 jOJ.ned the contest, Wallac~ was unsure 
.,)f wnicll. pa,rt'y coull llrj"ng abcutthe best conditions vithi,a a 
::Iiv ;'~.n country. 
wallace wrote: 
,Cn i;..he forthcoming 'elections iil Nicaragua 
IlSaC;lsa makes it appea.r that the forthcoming 
31ections are a ii'i4t between eJCtreme I:eactionaries and 
proqress.i.v~s ·of the .:).i.)moz" t'ype. In a country v.here only about 
aalftbe J;leople Ciln .:'<: ad <lnd lIIei te it is probably pretty hard 
to have a ge.lluin€ deilvcracy and I haven't the slightest idea as 
t 
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As a result Ofiiit u,;;ltions such as these, Wallace was 
continually 'jlJe.stiDnia'l wllichpolitical party could best 
i.ndustcl.ali za a cOlla try. A liberal regime was usually 
flrefera.ille to a cu~servati ve government since it usually 
4l1owed greater ~clic~c41 freedoms, however, the conservative 
regimes ilece mOl:e li.Kell to maintain order. This problem was, 
at le~st. .tal: thE Vice president. academic since the Good 
leighllor policjwaa .oa;.>ed on the theory of non-intervention. 
L, 'itin. American goverullieats, as long as they could maintain 
power and statilit1, waald be recognized by the United states 
in most installces. 'laas l:he practical side of Wal.lace allowed 
aim to SllfP;)rt dicta,tai within the hemisphere as lo.ng astilese 
.:tictators were ccmmitted to the goal of industrialization. In 
.i convet::satioa wit.a tD<:! Vice president of the Philippine 
Islands, jallace tl;llltly ;.ita ted that since tbe majority of the 
~eople 1n the underJeve~oped nations did not know how to read 
d 'ad ilrit.e Ua dictat.orsdip which rapidly increased the 
parcentage of improved the nutrition a.nd 
industria.lizaticn wit.ilout interfering to apy great extent with 
the FOIU: l ' reeacms miqllt. be justified as a preliminal:yto 
Jemocrac i·"(.22 ) 
l'he goal of l.teedo6l £ rom want seems to ha vefina11y led 
J allace to pcli tiCii 1 c on serva'tism. It appears that the 
i?ractical side cfw,~ VLce PreSident dictated the use of 
.:ll.lestionable lDEthod;;», hOilfever, the ethical idealism never left 
aim. illan preSSEd fo..: a jlIan in a given situation Wallace 
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displayed many cOdsarvative traits, yet his theoretical 
philosophy remained A~e£ican liheral. His ideals and the plans 
..,eemillglt neces~itataj D1 reality created a constant tension in 
t.be Vice Pl:€sident's coab .. nuing searc.h for a middle way. 
Alt.no\lg.aWallaca lias willing to work with the dictato!:s 
.aoldillg pOlle.!: in l.atl.n Alilerica, he was not uncritical ofthelli. 
Jis concern for ~l:in~Lnq 4bout higher living standards for the 
~aor iII Ii rapid ma.l1uer was genuine and Wallace c .riticized all 
who opposed this vie. iac~uding those in the state Department. 
During a controle.csy ..Ln tAle tin mines in Bolivia ~al1ace stat.ed 
that: nthe state Depd.ctmeat wants a revolution to the right and 
Jnly giies Ii, serv.l.c.:! 1;.0 the formation of a gov:ernmentw}:ich 
iould re"l.ly hel~ tll-a pe.lple of Bolivia get a higher standa.rd 
'Jf 1i Villg_ n(23) ial.l.ice appea.rs to .ha ve been well aware of the 
close ties AlIle.ticanJ...I1tecestsboth private and public had with 
lI1iU1.Y Latin Amel:icall ~pv~rnments which carried on questionable 
;;lracticas Dot.h in re.qard (,,0 economic and political matters .. 
walJ..ace was CO'ltl.ll,Jally alarmed by the relationship 
Det weeen Amilr ica n r<d~resentati ves especially those employed by 
i:he Sta;te DepaLt.mellt dad their ties to private concerns 
,)peratill;J ill thE s.lutha.tn part of the hemisphere. For:me,c 
AmbassadQ£ DaniElE £11.:30 o£ought this to Wallaces' s attention. 
"we have llad t .OO .ill4IiY Ambassadors and l'1inist.ers abroad who 
reg.ird ·tllemselllEs as t.he .cepresentati ves of the Standard Oil. 
Jatheleaalll, and ot..llec monopo.listic profiteers. "(24] Other 
agencies weraa lse ion volved. The Vice President wrote to 
l?resid,ent EaoSEielt concerning cases involving conflict of 
interest. It lias discovered that some agents of 
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·the 
Lleco~stI:'llctiOll I ind.u~nce Corporation (RFC) were also owners of 
~conomic CODcerns op.a,i:'ating in Latin America. It was found 
chat maay ·Jf ttese CClllcarns had realized extensive p.rofits in 
I:b.eir dealiags wita the United states Government. In 
1\.rg anti.ua., RFe· 5 cnit l:epresentat ive was primar i11 responsible 
for pllrc.aa.s.ing tungstan.. He was the biggest se~ler of tungsten 
in tllat country andue l:.~presented his own corporation and the 
RFC in arran;ling an alvd.Dce of $100, 000 from t.he BlC to his 
C orporat.LOll. In B;) .. i lI'J.d, the t.wo men who represented the RFe 
Jare part ow.a~J:s of the largest properties from which the 
Jni ted Stat<!!s Govemmeat. pUI:chased its Beli vian tungsten. Two 
uti.llion dollars in Rjt',; iO.:lns had been made for the development 
of the ~coperties.. in 1.>aru, the RFe repcesentative was a full 
time offieiai of the corap<1nyfrom whieh RPC fure . hased its .lead 
and zi.nc, .hi~e in Ciu.le,Doth theRFC representatives were top 
(Jfficial.ii of a huge 4itriite company £.rom whi'ch the United 
states JJougJ.lt 5i ;Jni..;icdll t amoUD ts of nitrate.{ 25) Although 
Ii allace wanted th.e ;.lei V(.Lt~ sectoc to opecate relatively fceely 
La .Latill America, spe.::ific duties and et.hical guidelines had to 
tJ2 i.1let. 
ia~ldce continl.ldl.ly..»et forth the duties of business and 
t?drdlD.Oulit aiDong thi!se,l uties was the duty to produce to the 
lim.it. it i3 fer tilLS i:ed50n that Wallace despised ,cartels and 
:Jeneral mODIlpoli5tic p£.:lcticeswhich perpetuated a world of 
:.::;carcity_ Au e~ViCODll1enL of healthy competition was necessacy 
to cid t.he ccuntc.i of cartels. According to Wallace, these 
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cartels .add >3xtCE meli ddJIld. gi;ng ef.fects on United S·tates-tatin 
American 
.Jpportulli.tie3 to cemellt 
the United states had missed many 
detter relations with its southern 
lleighDors uecau~e o.f cdrtels. "'Time andtille again the effort s 
Jf the Uru. ted states to form closer bonds with our Lati.n 
American aeighlorscame (,0 nothing because cartels had decrEed 
tlla t Amer ~caR in tEre;;its s ... au Id not compete in South Ame.rican 
countries. ilL 26] Als'l! the businessmen operating throughout the 
ilemisphere h,:td to fttct.he.c the interests of the common man. For 
j :tllace, tbi.,. cri terJ.JD dJ.. va ys had to be met. 
iia.l.laceccnsta.utl¥ advocated prosperity fo.r all in his 
Jeneral political and ecoilcmic theories. Be also understood 
t.adt t.ne pcivate S3CLO.c and the governllentalagencies wbicn 
jfte.a attellpted tc pJ.:''ltecc that sector did not always operate 
lIfitJl that maxim j n iuad. In June of 1945, the state Depa.rtment 
~dS apparaatly stron~ly in favor of an Inte~national Telephone 
dnd Telegrapa (Il+X) ta~~Jver of ~el[ericsso.n--the 11exican owned 
par·t of t4e phonE syst.em.. The Export-IlIpo.rt Bank vould loan 23 
Jlil1ion dcllarsto .I '~+.J: in order to buyout Mexericsson and 
that co~pany' s told~n~s in Mextelco, the IT+T affiliate 
\) per atia'.:l ia !lExica. LT -+-X would benefit th.rough economies of 
~c:lle as we.ll as the aii,J-hdr rates it vould be allowed to charge 
,l.fterta·e . ,takeover. It Ii ould therefore he able to repay the 4 
percent .late.cest char-:je dnd retire 75 percent of the principle 
lfithiu twent.¥ YE.ars. II TOle state Department people were not at 
~ll saocA-ed <1t thE .J.dea that the United states Governme.nt 
shoula ~se its Eower to aelp one of our utilities to raise its 
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ratas iu a fJreig8 cQuntry in order to make a loan good which 
adS beeLi. made 1:y ~l1j.S country. It seems that this type of 
thing ha.d beell donE .::19 a....nand again by the state Department 
:l arl 14g vi th p r iva te corpo rations. If[ 27 ] 
iial.l.ace, and se;;;retac y of the Treasury Morgenthau vere the 
only mEm~ers of the ~lI' aank meeting to protest tbe action • 
.rilis example illustrate.:; t.he major difference betllleen Wallace's 
.i..delS, d.ad t.he eC')11011U.C plans of other liberals aad 
consErvative,;; of t~e &,ime. Unlike unnecessary concentrat.ion, 
::ontr:ol was not. an evil per se. But if incr:edsed control did 
1l0t oellefit tbec<)iIlmon man thenWd.llace believed it to be a 
paor idea. This anti ot.a.ereconomic ideas remained intact 
t h.r 0 11 9 hou:til. is 1 i .f etJ.lll e. 
Alti10uga :te 'lever dr:ew up specific plans, Wallace 
,l1a.intained his {:csitJ.IJJl Oa the need for Latin American dollar 
axchange. de sti1L aeJ.ieved that if Latin America could 
increase .aer dcllarres~rves, s ,h,e could purchase more of 
America's e~cess i>1:adact. It is for this r:easol1 that Wallace 
;;;ontinudJ..Ly mai nt.d.in<!d ilis pasi tion 0.1.1 the need for t.he 
Jevalcpment ofncn-coUlpet.J.nq <Joods.{ 28] 
A.ltii.ouga Wallace· seconomic plans were ge,nerally sound# he 
liI.issed ;ill important p':co.a.l.~m vh.ieh vould later effect UnitEd 
;i 'C.ates-Lat i.n A II,E ricaa ti: ads relations. In the immediate post 
ill aryeacs# lior 1 d deillaad i·J.r 
aig n. The Un i ted ;i t.atra s 
American products was 
Government felt that 
extI:emely 
it had to 
ddequate.l.Y meet dcme",,·tic demand which in the post war years was 
the iligbest in hi.;H; 04' y. The American consumer now had the 
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the reconstruction of 
but also on moral 
a tremendous amount of 
cesoucce.» to this endeavor Which lias labeled the Marsha.ll plan • 
. with the increased ta.n..;io.n between the united states and the 
soviet ilnion, Westel:ll Eurape had to .be rebuilt in the fastest 
p<>ssil:>le manner. B(u:.h .oithese plans had catastrophic effects 
;)n Latiu American eC0.10iJU.dS. 
NOt. only did Alle.rica' s postwar priorities have grave 
econoillic on Latin America, but there were 
j:Jolitical ral.l1ificatioas d.:i well. In the economic sphere, the 
~atin Aillerican natiollS B4d built up ~arge dollar reserves over 
tae couc~e of the liar. 1.iJ. tin American war time demands for an 
itlCrEdSa in the ail,)U.llt of American goods were constantly 
irIL3t.cat'=!u by thE iact. <eli" t the United states had to devote a . 
Jlajo.city of her Slu.pp.l.ag resources to the war e .ffort. These 
Jemands were met by prcaises of post war prosperity_ When the 
United states CQuld aace ..tqa.in devote her resources to cousumer 
::loads, .ain America W-li.li..d receive her fair share as a just 
ceward for the paLieac~ alld help the souther.n hemisphere 
afforded t.he W31: eff·;)ct.· 
rhis was not ta ~e tde case. In the immediate post war 
[ears, J..atiJl Allericd. .a;:t a low priority partially because the 
contiuent did not appea.r to American foreign policy makers to 
oa inte'1cal in inulled.Lat.e post war plans. Once again Latin 
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American llatio ns askel tad Uni ted states for more American 
~roducta in an att~mpt to meet consumer demand as well as to 
L.od ustriiili,ze. 'lbesa .. de!Acl nds were met w.ith minima.! ,increases 
.1. a the <judntitycf -loads shipped to Latin America. Instead of 
i? 'Jrchasillg large amounts ;;)f goods, the dollal: reserves bid up 
~~e price of imporceJ goods and created a large degree of 
iuflatioll. The .guestloh remains: why did Wallace miss so 
fundament.al a FICD~ 'i!m aad if he did not, why were his general 
~co nomic theories \lad;)1e CO combat the probl~lll. 
At t4e foundatioa of Wallace's theory was the idea of 
illdustrializaticn tu.J:oaq.a the borrowing of resources from th,e 
.1.ndqstci"".lized wCl:id. .4£ the Latin American nations could 
iililintaia a sufficiallt dollar reserve, industrialization would 
De ea;;iiac as the Latia american community would not have to 
DO.rrow as heavily. By the end of 1945 t .heLatin Amer.icaR 
adtious .aad sufficie.aJ:. ;lQ..&.la r reserves, but nothing to spend it 
on. TRey coald n'H.thaI: borrow nor buy the products for 
.i..ndustt:ializdticn froJl tll~ United States. It appears evident 
taat wallace mi~s€d tai;i problem completely. 
Had ila.llacebeaa ~W" ra that such a p,rotlem might occur in 
~he Fost war world, way d~d he advocate the development of 
non-competing Floductsl Had he realized post war priorities 
earlier, it lIouldhav~ ;;:teamed wiser to adVocate the development 
Jf basic iddustry LD Latin America on a much larger scale. 
:~his jfou.l.d have speed.sd ap development and helped to mai,Dtain a 
Jii,)ra staDIa hemisphel:e. ...hile this episode demonstrates a lack 
,)f. foresight in cne d.i:e.t Jf wal~acets thought, it can also lead 
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to many ~enacali2atL~ns on the way in which ~allace formulated 
ais ideas. 
In tl1e Eccnomi.:: sphere, Wallace generally addressed 
:>roblems from a laa.;, t.;:rm perspective. 'Ihis would partially 
account ~or his lack of ~oresiqht in analyzing future economic 
dava.lopments in LatJ.aA1ll3rica. .In most instances his eco,nc·mic 
theories wet:a 9E DE ra.l. and consistently lacked detail. Henever 
thorollqhl.y euunciateJ do ;ahort term plan. Also, the short term 
;.llattecs heattell~ted t.o de tail :were addressed in a reactive 
;j}aR ner. Except ia tue field of .agricul ture# Wallace rarely 
j,lt'ought torth a det.ai.led plan ready to be implemented. 
Las tead, he he Iped to rework existing plans and critisi zed 
;)the,rs. lh.is may be.inat.Iler reason why Wallace did not foresee 
the froD ... ams lifhich wO\lld:levelop in Latin America. 
PoLitical ramiiJ.ca tl.ons for America' s post war plans we.re 
Jreat aa well. first, t.;;'~ inability to meet consumer demand in 
Latin Allierica E~pecl.ally .hen th~ environment fostered high 
I'!lCpeccations created soc.l.al unrest throughout the soutlern 
.iemisphere. The \1a.i:'ea~ worried the business community dnd 
cesult.ed in d. loss ot V~llt. ure capi tal from the Latin American 
a.::onomy_ Consequently. the in.dustriali2ation process was 
iurthac cet~rd£d. ~lso, Latin American natio.Ds finally 
cealized :waerE Ame.cicaa priorities lay and thus aligoed 
thelilse1'1les wit .b natiQ.ds other than the United States whose 
iaterests .... ecesi.ltild.~ to their own. The lOll priority of Latin 
Amecica ecoded the Co.afLal'lnceC)L the Latin American nations, a 
-:onfidellce which BdJ tdj(~n over a decade to build. The United 
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::ita tes .as to~lowin'1 ,i pO-.lr post var bl ueprint. 
A pe.cs;Jnal frJ.enj, of Wallace, the Director of ·the 
.()apartme.at ;;)i Sccial \'i-alfare Clemons J. France, once 1IIIote 
t.int Amecica had two cho~ces in the post flar era: the first was 
to _fil~lotl the line of iliJ.nston Churchil.l and imperialism while 
che otbe~ ~as to foll~w the line of America' s great 
cevo.lutioaary lEade~3. _ ~r. France believed that the world was 
l.Dv;Jlved in a re iclutum :;l nd the onlyindi viduals not affected 
";)y the t:<!o,lutic.n were Alilericans as well as a small pe.rcEntage 
,}f Arist>JC.rats and Tories in Europe. 1945 marked the end of an 
.aistorical epoch and £SVO.L utionary change was to guide the .near 
future. ac. FranceilliJ.S c{)Dcerned that the United states would 
ilotlead or evell Fassl. vel'l accept the idea of revolution. "The 
Jeplorab . .iLetac t is th4t ilia will not only .fail to lead but we 
~ill be a dray uFcn ~ae gceat changes which will affect mankind 
in this new .IlistoricaL epoch." For France, it was imperat.ive 
tilat ·tae United States c.aoose the properioreign policy. "All 
'lie have to d{) is to i:iscerc.ain the aspirations of hundreds of 
millions of pEop19s ia Europe, the aspirations of 
Dillion tieople in Asi4 aaJ. the South Seas, and place our 
,aehind those as pirdt.io ItS no matter what the result, no 
J.f it upsets every Olle of our preconcei v,ed 






This idea fit pe.cLectly with Wallace's concept of a 
centu£y of tile CCllmo.il ;2iill. Wallace later vrotetoFra.nce 
conveying his illpressi.o.ils of a copy of ;France' 5 letter to 
;.iraan: "i have .1:Eady.>ur . l.etter to Senator Green and am struck 
the cla .[ity af your vision."[30] As a 
philosopher, Wallace ::lad. j.iberalism remained united. 





circles, he still cha~p10aed the cause of the common man in the 
t> iJblicfocuill a.ndal tho;! gh he appears to ha va beeu concernEd 
"ita the way inllihicd tile united states was formulating ber 
foreign po.lic y, he ;..: on 31. stently placed Ametica on the side of 
cevclutionary change ila~A speaking in the putlic forum. "Our 
ciloice is betwEEn dailOCr.icy for everybody and dmoc.racy for the 
few--between thE ~pre::1dl.Bq of social safeguards and economic 
opportuni~y for all ~he peoFle--or for the concentraion of our 
a.iJu.adant resou.cces ia be hands of selfishness and greed. ttl 31 J 
.It appea.ts tllat lI<:1l1ace was more willing to accept 
conservati l1e !REanS ~n lU. s mature thought Frimarily because he 
:ll1,lerstood tae dEpeadent celationship of Latin America ou the 
united states. Tdose wbo possessed the resources to 
,indu5trid~ ize Latin ~iiler ~ca were conservati ve.flAs I look to 
eile fucure 1: alsc ha.ve g.ceat faith in the developme.nt of great 
ci.vilizat.iolLi in Latl..4 America and China.. These developements 
.ill depend in lar'le llleasure on .hOll well we in the unite~ 
States measure ull to oue opportunity for world l.eadership 
during the yea.cs 44illediately abead. U {32] He also understood 
that the !Jnited states cO.l.ld make many mistakes in her help 
;lita 1ndustriali7ing i:ll<! southern part of the hemisphe.re. 
j)urJ.n~ thi~ pe.cia.:1, Wallace changed and broadened his 
choughts OD acaDemic ~attars and applied his energies to the 
~H)liticaJ. spherE as well. He developed a theory .0£ linkage in 
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~hich he rea~izEd tbat ei~nts that took place in a part~culac 
;J.rea alld glci:al raalJ.fications. .Econcm.ic and political 
cJndit ions i.u C IJ,e part at the world al¥ays affected other areas 
a.lthough as.1ally inJi&::€ctly_ Thus the guest for freedom in 
.f.atin Amec iCdwas in part a quest for world 
Lceedom in the Ulu.teJ. States.[33] The 
freedom including 
first freedom to be 
sought WdS fceedclI iCilm Alfant, then political freedoms could be 
gained.. fl .... WE Slld.Llolever have feedom in the United states 
;JIltil thet's loS a veq' COll" iderable amoun t of freedom every .. bere 
els~ i.n the ;;forld.III]"] 
As tIle Vic\i! Pres..l.dent's thought matured, tvo often 
opposin'J lIi12\1ls had to 00 compromised. His mature thought was 
':illed iiith an et~l.cdl idealism which had continued from his 
t2arlier periods, .ao.evec, this ethical idealism was now 
tampered by the gcaWl.a'l practical side of wallace. 'Ille 
;.Jcacticai.. side grew da w.d . l.lace had more co.otact with Latin 
American problems aSid the o,bs·tacles which often blocked his 
plans to alleY ia.te taos~ p.roblems. Through his work in the 
.dE., WalL~c'!i! was c..lDtia ually being educ>ated in the ar·t of 
caalpo.litick, aD edllCd tl.O.i:l he put into constan t use. 
Alt1lOuq.a ial1acecovered a somewhat broader range of 
"abjects durins th~3e ~atter years, he never fOLgot the 
filndamEH1:ta.l positiou5 iI.ill.ch made him so popular i.n Latin 
AJlericd.. While tis meaDS grew increasingly conservative in his 
mature period, the qOdUa lle sOllqht never changed. Even in the 
iater caasecvative yaa.cs, his ethical idealism kepth~m saf$ly 
Lfi the left ~ost par~ of the American liberal camp. His 
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J..lltimate contact :ind Jtaowledge led him to advocate policies 
wllich he believed woa.i.d wark in a rapid ma.Dner at the same time 
JLlintainJ.ag a stai>leeilvi£onment for all classes of people. 
'rae peeples' re lC lutl.~n W.J,S to be an industJEial revolutio.n and 
this .revolution ila.:i supposed to hasten social reform rather 
tilan apnea val. 
An industrial c ·eY'o.J..l1tion never took place to any 
:.il1ostant.l.al degee.e. How~ ve r, the order which Wallace believed 
.!leceSsarito the industcl. .... lization process -was instituted aDd 
lDdintaiued. 'Ihis led ta stagnation and repression throughout 
.i.oat in · AllleL'ica.I I man., O.L: tllese counteies, a degree of .freedom 
ijHS sa.cc.l.ficed in order 4:. 0 bring about the stability w.hich was 
~ pce.ce1lj.l.site <1 the .iaaastria.lization pro-cess.. This led to 
~~rse conditions for che common man in Latin America. 
It was in t.a.l..31 dt ter period that iallace realized that 
the fastast road to J..Jldllstrial development lay in creating a 
stable atmospheLew .. t.h caceful 'lovern me'D t s upervisionin a 
limited number cf areJ.s. Social revolution might throw off the 
<:llains ofinjust.l.ce, but it could never speed up the 
.l.nd ustrL:dizatic D· PJ:O'; ess. St.ability therefore , lias essential. 
Alt.i1oagh wa~lace tega.a £;) recognize class interests during this 
cime, he mailltained&.aat iIlutual interests between the classes 
~ere iae geea tEe in :ilUl1hJer. He therefore no longer ad vQcated 
i,lolicieswllich liculdaurt the upper classes unless problems 
SEltere e.ncught.o warrant it. The economic pie no longer 
..lad to De re-cut, it .:HJllply had 
.l.nterest and Lecipx;)cal needs 
to be enlarged. "Mutual 
are the firmest basis for 
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l.a.tacnatJ.iJ'ilaJ. ccq:ee.:tt.i',Hl by feee peoples .. He 3S] 
• 
CO NCLUSICNS 
CoatJ:culictica i:1ppears to have accompanied Henry A. 
iallace tlu:ouqbout ",i:i career. In his search for effective 
'II or Id o:cgani4a tieD ill ga4e ral, and Latin A merican de velopment 
l.R particular, he ;; ont.LDually attempted to balance stability 
dnd ord..e.r agd~nst socJ.dl.justice.. His rhetoric stcessed t.be 
.11 ee;j for Aama.,n ri ghts, ti1~ allev.iation of~aterial needs, and a 
.ocoader lJ..ndE!cstandinq bet.ween all people o.f t.he wocld. 'I.hese 
the mes eacth~d him &;.he respect, admiration, and hope of the 
m3jari~1 af Latin ADe£~cans. However, his plans were 
lJ.!lrealistic p:c illdCiJ..{ iieca use of the assumptions he made and 
t.he laCK of e.ttecti va mec" anisms to safeg uardhis system. 
TIle possibility fo£ dbuse .remained too strong in many of 
c<J;illace's iJeas. ,ltJ..tilo\lgn in his mature period, Wallace 
lttempted to build sdfequ:lrds into his system byrealizillgthe 
;leed for an interd3t '1.coup type ocganization within society, 
this was not enough. ':tile ucbeck1l of labor and government on 
the DUSl.UeSS ,COJuuru..t.yW.;1S not sufficient to force the private 
sector til act in the ile::»t interests of theenti.ce society • 
• 'lost Latin Americda . uii icials did not desire to al ter the 
pJblic o:cprivate .celationship between themselves,t.heir 
:Jovernmentsand i.:Jrel.,.n corporations operating in their 
cOllnt.cl_ Those iihicll d~d were rarely powerful enough to force 
t.he cO.Lpo:caticns ope.:-atiuq within thei.r countcies to acceoeto 
c.beir ~ishes.( 1) Thus .a.1..lace appears to have been overly 
.)ptiaistic, placing too much trust and faith in the private 
!3ector. 
89 
wallace cc nstall,t, I ,' assumed that in the majority of 
sit uations, the ~ri Vol ~ sectorwou_ld act in an ethical manner. 
de seems to _have qiil'en the ben·efit of the doubt to the 
capcesentatives of r.iu.s segment of society. Despite the 
~latant conflict of ~aterest which Wallace brought to 
aoosevelt.- S ;1ttentioil [reier to Hay 1942-1946: Matured Thought, 
fl. 7,), the Vice pr~~ide.u.t concluded his letter about these 
conflicts of iJlteres~ inl101vinq the representatives of the RFC 
Dr statiag t.dat: "T.bese lI~n are honest loyal American citizens. 
thei sarveti alC aac aus-a RPC requested t bem to. The issue is 
:dillp . ly tilat oflilethect.hey should have heen asked to represent 
t_lle o.s. Goverltllent" in .:I.ts dealings with producing industries 
in whica t t£l lIere pecso!ldlly and financiall y interested. tiC 2 J 
The liIal.i.ace .aluapciat did not alter the relationship 
.llet -4eeathe liork€l: dadt.aa capitalist elite. Workers might win 
IilO.I:'2 w.hell tha ece nomyil~s expanding at a rapid pace,# however, 
t.here was no .mechani.;iJl J. n Walla·ce ' s plan to maintain and i.nsure 
these 9dJ.ns. TO a la~ge ~eqree, the workers were at the mercy 
of the pcopertieQ classes. Those without a stake in the system 
would halle to wait a 3ul)st.antial period before they received 
.lolY ,i)enefits if t.h,;;!y ~ere going · to recei ve a.nrt-hing at all • 
.iori<e.cs, • .ita a ll,ar~iadJ. ... take in -the system could not insuz:-e 
t.l1eir PQsition and woa.J.d live a life of insecurity. Wallace 
pla.ced toolltllchfait.il ia ;J. private sec'tor which was anything 
JJut dltruist.ic and lie did not entrust the government with 
anoug-ii power to ccmbd"t t.ileabuseswhich might arise. 
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For wal~ace, the governmentiias to act in a reactive 
JldUner • Ihat is tJ s;J.·(, the private sector would be trusted 
• ith the first attempt. at develofment. Although the government 
VI as a.llowed tc flau aad coordinate, it was the pri vate sector 
.hicilwd.3 to nave tbeinitial chanc,e of a.lleviating the 
problems ot the c').dlmon man in Latin America. Only if the 
pt"ivate ;:;ector 1IiEret~ .eail or decline to take the necessary 
initiative ~as the gaY~rnmentto intervene. This placed the 
J(Jve.cnmei1£ i .u a sitaation in which it would only be able to 
confront ptolJlems aft<dr tAey had been created. This would have 
~llo weQc.ime .tor the ':)J:oU.j.em to become acute.. In the case of 
1: he CO 1Il1lW Il man, it ilig.na: have meant tha t lie would ha ve had to 
('Cllerat.e a condi tien ,;,f jJJ verty for an increased lengt.h of 
Jere of ten t.n.d.D not, the pei vate sector created as many 
problems as it belpeu. to com.bat in Latin America. 
The pciV'ate secti.lr dJ.d a poor job of changing the life 
i?:lttern of t.he c\) ill III oa man in Latin America. Despite the 
ano.rmoDS influJ( cf cdllit.d.1 during the war" the common man of 
l.'1tio America still .J....i. ved in a state of poverty. EvenWal.lace, 
who as head of the 8EW had theopportullity to effect a 
relatively ~argE a&au3t of change, had little to boast about. 
Ii hile :fa .belie VE d taat. ii.is plans would wo.t:k, he was only able 
tv use a few successf,,1 examples to justify his theory" a 
,r;neory wilich wasfu..i.. oi.;ontradictions .. 
Altllougiliiallace' s ileas are easy to understand, he was 
rarely concise and diJ nat work all the bugs out. For Wallace, 
a constdut tension e~~~ted between the freedom of the 
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l.ildi vidud..l and ·tile aeeJ for stability which was necessary for 
J.adustri.tl pl:ogress. 7.his trade off was never thoroughly or 
clearly defined. wd.llace always emphasized basic standards of 
ireedom .lad et.hies yet .ae appears to have been more conceLned 
witll taeaeed for i.ldllstL:ial progress. There was no mechanism 
Ln thewa.Llace tl.an t.) s::tfeguard a minimum ~evel of civil 
libertie3. In latei: 1aai:. s, these liberties -were sacrificed in 
Jiles t of stab.il ity in Ldla n American with depressing results. 
lhus, civil libertLas illere .rep.ressed with the hope that this 
if auld foster ra pid industc ia! development which would be of 
lHuefit to t.he comila n 1ll1n. However I the Economic development 
\laich dl.d cake .~ lace jlLJ.lia rily benefitt·ed the upper clasess and 
foreig n capitalists. 
Most of iallac~ls 
rat.her t.Aaa the disease. 
plans attempted to cure the symptoms 
He tried to £ight poverty through 
programs which wOillJ. ,hd. va expanded prod uctiOD. However lit 
iIlust iJe pointed cutt.aat. the expanded pr<3ductioD did not 
dacessarl.ly insure Lila equi table distribution of goods. A 
iilodaru dal e:.tamfle iaLatin America might be Bra.zil. Since the 
caange of yovEuHlle.aC.l.il 1964 , Brazil has increased her GNP by 
.J.ppro.xillately 300 parceu t. Braz.il was able to achieve t.his 
~ith Silllst:intial lle.i.p from the industrialized world as 
iBtensiv~ investment. ay the private sector of the 
.i.ndustrial ized licLld is p.L: imarily responsible for the growth of 
Brazil's ecoaomy_ WaLle t.he upper strata of Brazilian society 
.1ldsoeneiitted a 9.r13;:it daal from the progress, the majority of 
.drazilialls have not ~ai.ued an.ything of significance. Most 
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drazilidllS still live in d state of poverty.. Thus, in a IIlodern 
day settinJ# aiiallaca tY+le plan ha .s not achieved the results 
Wallace mig.hthave pcadl.cJ:ed. 
While the Vica 2ce::aident .had a clear and .flexinle vision 
\II .(1en d€aii1l9 with 10lll t.e.::m objectives, his short term plans 
lifer e il1<i3ufticient. fiLS long run plans often blinded him to 
shor t ran proDlems .ala t iA are importantly be had difficulty 
adaptin<j Ids geDecdl. pl.an to s .hort term conditions. The 
.:iHlf.f& iny w l1icb resalteJ. in the short run created more 
discontent in the poorer segments of Latin America. This made 
the redll.zation cf jd.~lac~· s long term plans almost impossible. 
Xbe common aan af La~in ~IIlerica was unwilling to wait the long 
~ariod of tiJle neCeS;;idl:Y '0 the success ofliallace'sbluepri.nt 
dodd ~as eveatually illlwJ. .. U.ingto accept the unequal partnership 
.. hieh the Vice Eresident.'s ideas woald have created. 
Henry iiallace lIIa~ swcers in his desire to bring a1:out 
.<letter couditicDs ioe the common man in Latin America. 
d()wever,his placs II(H1" ",ave relegated Latin America, and the 
.f hird ~orld ill genaeal., to secondary importance. Although he 
sOl.lqht. an in teIdepeJldellt world, it would have heen an 
.l.nterdepelldeacl amollg unequal actors. Wallace did not 
understaad that his pLan would have perpetuated the larger 
~ys'tem t.uroug.h vhic.ll eXtlloitation had always taken place. Thus 
11 allace, "nose idEas .;1 re eepresentative o.f liberalism at its 
Jlost eLfecti we, c..leac.4¥ demonstra tes the limitations and 
failures of libeLalis~. 
BecaUse ii/a.l1ace stcessed the need to work within the 
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aystem, he could noc devise a method which might weed out the 
cOI:rupt; eiemeuts litfu.4tae Lati.n American socie .ty_ By working 
Ciu:ough c.lle 3)' stem. wJ.llace limited the types and the extent of 
the cllaage w.l1ich lIiCJ.lit t.d .. e~lace_ While pl:ogress might have 
£eslIl.ted hiJ.d a 'I.i:edt,;!r number of Wallace's plans been 
J.mplemeil1ted, the e.A:c.ent. of the progress would have been 
i as !lffic.l..eat tc all'! Vi. ate the problems which existed in La·tin 
Amecica.. Like most. Jell Deal liberals and mid-western 
~cogtess.Lves, hE ralied too heavily on sccial and political 
flrograss tllrough eCOll';)II1J.C expansion. 
Lika ja~~ac£, Herbert Hoover had also shared in this 
i.).co ·~.res3.ive idEal. dis engineering days had convinced him 1Iof 
tlle need fOi: uSJ.ag scientific expertise to improve 
30cioecoaom1c coadJ.tioIlS.ur 3) Although there were many 
differe.nce lIaen c~mpd.riag the ideas of these two men, some 
JJdsic si&ilacities d4J eX.i.st. The tw.olowa ptogressives sought 
d middle way baEEd 011 :the ad vance of technology, and a more 
,;a .juitab.le distribution of resources. Bot.h Wallace and Hoover 
~elie ved that i ne glla.4J. tr created disconteBt and could .lead to 
s;)cialism or fascll>Jl • . fiY expanding the pie, discontent might 
oe qaiet.ed. 'I bisi:ai-t.u blinded both pcl iticians to the 
contradictioas cf a. cdPJ.t.1~istic ordered society. 
Altll.oagil well J.atel1 tioned, denry A. Wallace did not 
caalize t.ae cant.radict.ions which existed witbin .his ideas. In 
add.cessiny some of Laese contradictions he moved steadily in a 
CODSErv~t.i va dire.ctiDa. 
the guest to reilldLn 
A S in the case of m.ost liberals, in 
or appear t .heoretically consistent, 
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.;iocially acceptatle .J.adpdiatable, as well as effective, Henry 
11. wallace u;ied conse~vat.oLve means in an attempt to bring about 
:30cially pLoJre.ssi ve .;iDa a umanistic goals. He attempted to use 
.i contrauJ..ct.orj a .nd qe.ner.i.l1y ine.ffec·tive theory to effect vast 
l.illpLOvemauts Lor toe cOiimon man. 
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